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Neoliberal Restructuring in the Eurozone Crisis: ‘New 










If we examine things from a different point of view, we could be able to see something that 
otherwise it would not be possible. This is the purpose of this thesis. It seeks to ‘see’ the reform 
process put in place – in the aftermath of the 2007 financial and economic crisis – within the European 
Union and in Italy from a different point of view. Specifically, applying Stephen Gill’s ‘new 
constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism’ theoretical framework, the reform of the labour 
market, as well as the institutional reform – proposed and partially implemented by Renzi Cabinet, 
between 2014-2016 – in Italy do not seem to be a mere ‘domestic’ or ‘internal’ issue. By contrast, 
this thesis argues that such regulations envisage a neoliberal restructuring of the Italian politico-legal 
system, which would confirm Gill’s claim that new constitutionalist measures aim to shift nation 
states from social democratic towards neoliberal orders. 
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Introduction 
Since 2007, the European Union1 (EU) has experienced a deep financial and economic crisis 
(also known as ‘Eurozone Crisis’ or ‘European Sovereign Debt Crisis’). Many International Financial 
Organisations (IFOs) conducted a huge number of studies aiming to understand the economic causes 
of the crisis. For the most part, these analyses substantiated that the causes of the crisis were 
essentially two: the 2007 financial crisis in the United States of America, as well as the high level of 
sovereign debts of many member states of the Economic and Monetary Union2 (EMU). As a matter 
of fact, Eurozone member states were not able to repay or refinance their public debt without the 
assistance of third parties, such as the EU, and the International Monetary Fund3 (IMF). On 28 May 
2013, however, J. P. Morgan Chase and Co.4 conducted a report – The Euro Area Adjustment: About 
Halfway There5 – which went beyond these widespread analyses and assumed that the financial and 
economic crisis was also triggered by political and legal factors. The J. P. Morgan’s report, indeed, 
supported that 
 
At the start of the [2007 global financial and economic] crisis, it was generally 
assumed that the national legacy problems were economic in nature. But, as 
the crisis has evolved, it has become apparent that there are deep seated 
political problems in the periphery [of Europe], which, in our view, need to 
                                               
1 The European Union (EU) is a political and economic union which includes 28 European member-states. It establishes 
common economic, social, and security policies. Its main institutions are: the European Council, the European 
Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the European Court of Europe. 
2 The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) – launched with the Maastricht Agreements in 1992 – involves the 
coordination of economic and fiscal policies, a common monetary policy, and a common currency of 19 out of 28 
European Union member states. It seeks to provide both economic growth and stability by a set of surveillance and 
sanctioning mechanisms established by EU and extra-EU laws.    
3 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international organisation – founded in 1945 at the Bretton Woods 
Conference – which promote international monetary co-operation, facilitate international trade, and foster economic 
growth.  
4 J. P. Morgan Chase and Co. is an American multinational banking and financial services holding company headquartered 
in New York City. It is the largest bank in the United States, the world’s sixth largest bank by total assets, and the world’s 
second most valuable bank by market capitalisation. Its services include investment banking, markets and investor 
services, treasury services, asset management, private banking, merchant services, wealth management and brokerage, 
and commercial banking. 
5 J. P. Morgan Chase and Co., ‘The Euro Area Adjustment: About Halfway There’ (Europe Economic Research, 28 May 
2013) <https://culturaliberta.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/jpm-the-euro-area-adjustment-about-halfway-there.pdf> 
accessed 8 November 2016.  
 8 
change if EMU is going to function properly in the long run. The political 
systems in the periphery were established in the aftermath of dictatorship, and 
were defined by that experience. Constitutions tend to show a strong socialist 
influence, reflecting the political strength that left wing parties gained after 
the defeat of fascism. Political systems around the periphery typically display 
several of the following features: weak executives; weak central states 
relative to regions; constitutional protection of labor rights; consensus 
building systems which foster political clientalism; and the right to protest if 
unwelcome changes are made to the political status quo. The shortcomings of 
this political legacy have been revealed by the crisis. […] There is a growing 
recognition of the extent of this problem, both in the core and in the periphery. 
[…] The key test in the coming year will be in Italy, where the new 
government clearly has the opportunity to engage in meaningful political 
reform. But, in terms of the idea of journey, the process of political reform 
has barely begun.6 
 
This brief, but significant section of the J. P. Morgan’s report triggered this research. The 
American financial institution, analysing the economic and financial performances of Eurozone 
countries in the midst of the 2007 economic and financial crisis in Europe, has directly linked the 
constitutions of Southern European countries – and their strong socialist influence – to the persistent 
character of the Eurozone crisis, as well as the improper functioning of the EMU. To be more precise, 
J. P. Morgan underlined that the political systems of Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece possess 
inherently weaknesses such as weak executives, weak central states in favour of local authorities, and 
strong labour protections. 
The J. P. Morgan’s report was published in the midst of a major reform process put in place 
both in the European Union and Italy to respond rapidly and effectively to the 2007 financial and 
economic crisis. At the supranational level, the European Union has primarily sought to restore 
economic growth by creating a favourable business climate for investors. To this purpose, the 
European political and economic union has deeply reformed its economic governance system through 
                                               
6 ibid 12-13. 
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the 2011 revision of the Stability and Growth Pact7 (SGP), the implementation of the 2013 Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union8 (TSCG), and two 
regulations9 (also referred to as ‘two-pack’). More specifically, the Stability and Growth Pact, the 
Fiscal Stability Treaty, and the two-pack set specific financial and economic parameters in order to 
ensure that contracting parties keep their public finance sustainable. In addition to this, these 
regulations established a set of both monitoring and sanctioning instruments which addressed any 
deviation from the financial and economic parameters, ensuring compliance of contracting parties 
with fiscal discipline. 
At the same time as the reconstruction of the current European Union’s system of economic 
governance, the then Italian Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi10, set an extensive political agenda which 
aimed to deal with the 2007 financial and economic crisis in Italy. This political agenda included, 
among many others, the reform of both the labour market and the institutional framework. With 
regards to the former, Renzi and the then Minister of Labour, Giuliano Poletti11, proposed and 
implemented the Law 183/2014 (also referred to as ‘Jobs Act’) which has involved a far-reaching 
reform of the Law 300/1970 (commonly known as ‘Workers’ Statute’). In the first place, the Jobs 
Act reformed both ‘open-ended’ and temporary contracts by establishing a brand-new contract type, 
i.e. contratto a tutele crescenti (contract with gradually increasing protection). This contract type 
does not provide any obligations for firms to reinstate workers after invalid dismissals unless these 
are discriminatory or orally communicated. The contract with gradually increasing protection thus 
                                               
7 The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) – entered into force between 1997-1999 – is an international agreement among 
the 28 member-states of the European Union. The agreement sought to strengthen the monitoring and coordination of 
national fiscal and economic policies. The Stability and Growth Pact has been revised for the first time in 2005. The 
revision sought to better consider individual national circumstances, as well as to strengthen surveillance and coordination 
of both fiscal and economic policies.  
8 The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) – also known as 
Fiscal Stability Treaty – is an intergovernmental treaty which entered into force in 2013. The treaty seeks to strengthen 
the economic pillar of the economic and monetary union by mandating fiscal discipline, coordination and governance. 
9 The two-pack – entered into force in 2013 – reinforces economic coordination between Member States and introduces 
extra monitoring instruments. 
10 Matteo Renzi served as President of the Province of Florence (from 2004 to 2009), as Major of Florence (from 2009 to 
2014), and as Italian Prime Minister (from 2014 to 2016). From 2013 to 2018, he was the Secretary of the main Italian 
social-democratic political party, Partito Democratico (PD). 
11 Giuliano Poletti served as Minister of Labour and Social Policies both in the 63rd and 64th Cabinets of the Italian 
Republic. 
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obliges firms to simply reimburse workers with a minimum economic compensation. In the second 
place, the labour reform extended the use of hourly-tickets (also referred to as ‘vouchers’). These 
vouchers are a non-standard type of employment relationship which allow firms to compensate 
workers for occasional supplementary jobs. According to the framers of the bill, the Jobs Act would 
have involved a twofold aim: it would have boosted employment (in particular for women and young 
people), while reducing the use temporal and atypical type contracts.  
With regards to the latter, reform of Italy’s institutional framework also came to be considered 
a priority for Renzi Government in the awake of the crisis. The then Italian Prime Minister and the 
then Minister of Constitutional Reforms and Relationship with the Parliament, Maria Elena Boschi12 
proposed the constitutional bill n. 1429-B. The bill called for altering the current relationship between 
the executive and the parliament, as well as the relationship between national and subnational levels. 
According to the framers, the constitutional bill would have overcome the lack of coordination 
between government and parliament, the overlapping of competences between state and regions and 
the lack of coordination in the division of responsibilities between central and local public 
administrations.  On 4 December 2016, Italian voters were asked to decide whether accept or reject 
the constitutional bill, and voted to reject it by a majority of 59.11% to 40.89% approving.   
Several legal scholars and political scientists have already analysed the major reform process 
put in place both in the European Union13 and in Italy14 in the midst of the 2007 financial and 
                                               
12 Maria Elena Boschi served as Minister of Constitutional Reforms and relationship with the Parliament of the 63rd 
Cabinet of the Italian Republic, as well as Secretary of the Council of Ministers of the 64th Cabinet of the Italian Republic. 
She is member of the Partito Democratico (PD).  
13 For the EMU reform, see: Kenneth A. Armstrong, ‘The New Governance of EU Fiscal Discipline’ (2013) 29/13 Jean 
Monnet Working Paper Series <http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Armstrong.pdf> accessed 10 
April 2017; Fabien Terpan, ‘Soft Law in the European Union: The Changing Nature of EU Law’ (2015) 21/1 European 
Law Journal <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00911460/document> accessed 17 April 2017. 
14 See: Beniamino Caravita, Referendum 2016 sulla Riforma Costituzionale. Le Ragioni del SÌ (Milano: Giuffrè 2016); 
Luciano Violante, ‘La Riforma Costituzionale e il Referendum. Le Ragioni del SÌ’ (2016) 2/2016 Questione Giustizia 
<http://questionegiustizia.it/rivista/pdf/QG_2016-2_06.pdf> accessed 6 November 2017; Roberto Bin, ‘Referendum 
Costituzionale: Cercasi Ragioni Serie per il NO’ (2016) 3/2016 Rivista AIC 
<https://www.rivistaaic.it/images/rivista/pdf/3_2016_Bin.pdf> accessed 6 November 2017; Eugenio De Marco, ‘Spunti 
di Riflessione sulla Riforma Costituzionale “Renzi-Boschi”. Una Riforma Ormai Improcrastinabile non Priva peraltro di 
Ambiguità e Nodi Irrisolti’ (2016) 2/2016 Rivista AIC 
<https://www.rivistaaic.it/images/rivista/pdf/2_2016_De%20Marco.pdf> accessed 9 November 2017; Valerio Onida, ‘La 
Riforma Costituzionale e il Referendum. Le Ragioni del NO’ (2016) 2/2016 Questione Giustizia 
<http://questionegiustizia.it/rivista/pdf/QG_2016-2_04.pdf> accessed 9 November 2017; George Tsebelis, 
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economic crisis in Europe. For instance, Professor Kenneth A. Armstrong argues that the adoption of 
the 2011 revision of the Stability and Growth Pact, the 2013 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, and the two-pack completed the restructuring 
process of the European Union’s system of economic governance, began in 1992 with the 
establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union. To be more specific, he affirms that the just 
mentioned combination of regulations involves the strengthening of a plurality and diversity 
instruments and mechanisms which impose fiscal discipline among contracting parties in Europe.15 
Along the same lines, the legal scholar Fabien Terpan states that the European Union - through its 
current system of governance – not only possesses the power to set specific fiscal and economic 
parameters, but also both monitoring and sanctioning instruments necessary to ensure compliance of 
contracting parties with fiscal discipline. In particular, he argues that these legal instruments reduce 
the room of manoeuvre of European Union’s member-states by a combination of elements. These 
consist of: guidelines and timetables for achieving goals, benchmarks which help to identify the best 
practice, and constant monitoring of economic performances.16     
Not only the reform of the European Union governance framework, but also the Jobs Act 
reform and constitutional bill in Italy have been the subjects of a great deal of political and legal 
analysis. With regards to the Jobs Act, Marta Fana, Dario Guarascio, and Valeria Cirillo argue that 
the Jobs Act has completed the making of a flexible labour market in Italy. In particular, they stress 
                                               
‘Compromesso Astorico: the Role of the Senate after the Italian Constitutional Reform’ (2017) 47/1 Italian Political 
Science Review, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-
core/content/view/AA5E60064356DFCBA9BD423261E20733/S0048840216000216a.pdf/compromesso_astorico_the_
role_of_the_senate_after_the_italian_constitutional_reform.pdf> accessed 24 October 2017. 
For the labour market reform, see: Marta Fana, Dario Guarascio, and Valeria Cirillo, ‘Labour Market Reforms in Italy: 
evaluating the effects of the Jobs Act’ (2015) 5/2015 ISIGrowth Innovation Fuelled, Sustainable, Inclusive Growth 
<http://www.isigrowth.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/working_paper_2015_5.pdf> accessed 8 June 2017; ‘Did Italy 
Need More Labour Flexibility? The Consequences of the Jobs Act’ (2016) 51/2 Leibniz Information Centre for 
Economics <https://archive.intereconomics.eu/year/2016/2/did-italy-need-more-labour-flexibility/> accessed 10 June 
2017; ‘La Crisi e le Riforme del Mercato del Lavoro in Italia: un’Analisi Regionale del Jobs Act’ (2016) Argomenti 3 
<http://ojs.uniurb.it/index.php/argomenti/article/view/573/577> accessed 13 June 2017; Carlo Dell’Arringa, ‘Il Jobs Act: 
Principi Ispiratori, Contenuti e Primi Effetti’ EUT Edizione Università di Trieste 
<https://www.openstarts.units.it/bitstream/10077/14013/1/Dell’Aringa_Mercato_lavoro_online.pdf> accessed 13 June 
2017. 
15 Armstrong (n 13) 15-18. 
16 Terpan (n 13) 13-26.  
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that the removal of hiring and dismissal restrictions has involved the emergence of an extreme form 
of flexible workers.17 With regards to the institutional reform, George Tsebelis argues that the 
constitutional bill – if approved – would have reduced the number of veto players in the Italian 
legislative process and, as a consequence, it would have brought greater stability and efficiency to 
the whole system of governance.18 In contrast with this analysis, the Professor Gustavo Zagrebelsky 
argues that the constitutional bill would have involved an excessive centralisation of powers towards 
the executive branch, harming the whole institutional framework in Italy.19 
These studies thus well describe how the 2011 Stability and Growth Pact, the 2013 Fiscal 
Stability Treaty, and the two-pack have strengthened European Union’s legal capacity to ensure 
compliance, among its member-states, with financial and economic parameters. Or to address any 
deviation from such parameters by enabling monitoring instruments, as well as sanctioning 
mechanisms. Similarly, other studies describe how the Jobs Act made the labour market system more 
flexible in order to face unemployment and thus to restore economic growth. Or how the 
constitutional bill – if approved – would have made the institutional framework more efficient aiming 
to encourage both international and national investors to invest capitals in Italy. Accordingly, these 
analyses seem to apply a ‘problem-solving’ perspective to the politico-legal reform process in the 
European Union, as well as in Italy. This perspective is reflected in the work undertaken by the 
political scientist, Robert W. Cox – Social Forces States, and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relation Theory20 – in which he argues that ‘problem-solving theory’ 
 
takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships 
and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for 
action. The general aim of problem solving is to make these relationships and 
institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of 
trouble. Since the general pattern of institutions and relationships is not called 
                                               
17 Fana, Guarascio, and Cirillo, ‘Labour Market Reforms in Italy: evaluating the effects of the Jobs Act’ (n 14) 15-17. 
18 Tsebelis (n 14) 92-101. 
19 Gustavo Zagrebelsky, Loro Diranno, Noi Diciamo. Vademecum sulle Riforme Istituzionali (Laterza 2016) 96-97. 
20 Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relation Theory’ in Robert W. Cox 
with Timothy Sinclair (Ed), Approaches to World Order (Cambridge University Press 1996). 
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into question, particular problems can be considered in relation to the 
specialized areas of activity in which they arise. Problem-solving theories are 
thus fragmented among a multiplicity of spheres or aspect of actions, each of 
which assumes a certain stability in the other spheres (which enables them in 
practice to be ignored) when confronting a problem arising within its own. 
The strength of problem-solving approach lies in its abilities to fix limits or 
parameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a particular 
problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively 
close and precise examination.21 
 
By contrast, this thesis relies on a rather different perspective. In particular, it adopts a more 
critical perspective which reflects Cox’s idea of ‘critical theory’. As he argues, critical theory 
 
stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order 
came about. Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not take 
institutions and social power relations for granted but calls them into question 
by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in 
the process of changing. It is directed toward an appraisal of the very 
framework for action, or problematic, which problem-solving theory accepts 
as its parameters. Critical theory is directed to the social and political complex 
as a whole rather than to the separate parts. As a matter of practice, critical 
theory, like problem-solving theory, takes as its starting point some aspect or 
particular sphere of human activity. But whereas the problem-solving 
approach leads to further analytical subdivision and limitation of the issue to 
be dealt with, the critical approach leads toward the construction of a larger 
picture of the whole of which the initially contemplated part is just one 
component, and seeks to understand the processes of change in which both 
parts and whole are involved.22 
 
A notable theoretical framework that helps in writing a critical analysis of the politico-legal 
process put in place in the EU and in Italy in particular is the ‘new constitutionalism of disciplinary 
                                               
21 ibid 88. 
22 ibid 88-89. 
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neoliberalism’23 (or simply referred to as ‘new constitutionalism’), theorised by the political scientist 
Stephen Gill in collaboration with A. Claire Cutler. According to Gill, ‘new constitutionalism’ is the 
politico-constitutional mechanism associated with neoliberal restructuring of the world order.24 ‘New 
constitutionalism’ thus operates to create and preserve a neoliberal order which generates capital 
accumulation25, as well as provides favourable legal and other protections for investors.26 New 
constitutionalist measures, Gill further argues, insulate dominant economic forces from democratic 
pressure and popular accountability, and institutionalise the liberalisation of markets for capital, 
goods, and labour. The former seeks to make any political contestation against the neoliberal form of 
capitalism hard to achieve.27 The latter seeks to generate economic growth and extend capital 
accumulation.28  
From a ‘new constitutionalism’ perspective, thus, very important hypotheses concerning the 
implications of the legal reform process that took place within the European Union and in Italy might 
be addressed: 
 
1.! The first hypothesis concerns the European Union as a whole. I will suggest (see Chapter 1) 
that the European Union proposed and implemented a combination of regulations – such as, 
the 2011 revision of the Stability and Growth Pact, the 2013 Fiscal Stability Treaty, and the 
two-pack – designed to strengthen neoliberal governance in Europe. In the first place, as we 
shall see, the European Union has thus imposed strict fiscal discipline upon its member-states 
to address fiscal imbalances. In the second place, the European Union possesses a set of 
monitoring and sanctioning instruments which address any deviation from the just mentioned 
fiscal discipline. Owing to this, the European political and economic union has primarily 
                                               
23 See: Stephen Gill, ‘New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy’ (1998) 10/1 Pacifica 
Review: Peace, Security & Global Change 23; ‘European Governance and New Constitutionalism: Economic and 
Monetary Union and Alternatives to Disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe’ (1998) 3/1 New Political Economy 5; Stephen 
Gill and A. Claire Cutler, New Constitutionalism and World Order (Cambridge University Press 2014). 
24 Gill, ‘New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy’ (n 23) 23.  
25 ibid. 
26 ibid 23-24. 
27 ibid. 
28 ibid 26. 
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sought to maintain confidence of investors and credibility of governments by attempting to 
provide an appropriate business climate and thus to restore the process of capital 
accumulation. 
 
2.! The second hypothesis shifts the focus to the Italian context. I will argue that the Jobs Act 
(see Chapter 2), as well as the constitutional bill (see Chapter 3) involved a neoliberal 
restructuring of both labour market and institutional framework in Italy. Specifically, I 
advance the hypothesis that the European Union – through its current system of governance 
– committed Renzi Government to propose a neoliberal restructuring of both labour market, 
and institutional framework in Italy. With regards to the labour market reform, I argue that 
the Jobs Act sketched out a neoliberal reform of the Italian labour market. To be more precise, 
the Jobs Act sought to make the labour market more flexible – specifically by removing hiring 
and dismissal protections – in order to make the national labour market more amenable to 
investors’ needs and, as a consequence, to boost the economic growth. I also suggest that the 
Jobs Act has involved the emergence of a specific workers’ category, that is to say contingent 
workers. With regards to the institutional reform, the research hypothesises that the 
constitutional bill – had it been successful – would have involved a neoliberal re-organising 
logic of the Italian institutional framework. The bill would have strengthened the executive 
branch of government (the power of the Prime Minister, and the Minister of the Finance, for 
example) to the detriment of the legislative branch (i.e. the Italian Parliament). 
 
In order to address the two above-mentioned hypotheses, this thesis will draw upon several 
legal and economic sources. In the first place, I will draw from official statements of the European 
Central Bank, directives of the Council of the European Union, regulations from the European 
Parliament, and studies and reports from the European Commission (such as, Annual Growth 
Surveys, In-Depth Reviews, Country Specific Recommendations, and Review of progress on policy 
measures relevant for the correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances). In the second place, I will gather 
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information from both international media (such as The Guardian, and The Telegraph) and national 
media (including, Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica, and Il Fatto Quotidiano). Finally, I will draw 
from the Constitution of the Italian Republic, regulations (such as, Law 300/1970, Constitutional bill 
n. 1429-B, Law 183/2014), verdicts of the Italian Constitutional Court (e.g. verdicts n. 26/2017, and 
n. 28/2017), and reports and memoranda of Dipartimento per le Riforme Istituzionali, Ministero del 
Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, Confederazione Italiana Generale del Lavoro (CGIL), Istituto 
Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale29 (INPS), Istituto Nazionale di Statistica30 (ISTAT), Eurostat31, 
Eurobarometer32. 
Both documentary and quantitative research aim to prove the impact of the European Union’s 
system of economic governance on the political agenda setting (reform of both constitutional and 
labour laws) promoted by Renzi Cabinet between 2014-2016. In addition, this research will draw 
from the work of Stephen Gill and a large body of critical legal scholarship – inter alia, A. Claire 
Cutler, Adam Harmes, Saskia Sassen, Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck, and Nick Theodore – in order to 
understand and critically re-describe recent developments in Italy before reflecting on the 
implications of their understanding of the relationship between neoliberalism and law. My objective 
here is to enrich the existing body of knowledge concerning the role played by law in creating and 
preserving neoliberalism, by critically analysing the Italian reform process between 2014-2016. 
The thesis is divided into three different chapters. The first chapters – Between Neoliberalism, 
New Constitutionalism and the European Union – sets the stage for a critical legal analysis of the 
Jobs Act, as well as the constitutional bill. In the first place, the chapter sketches a brief history of 
neoliberalism. More specifically, it focuses on its main features, and also how it is characterised by 
                                               
29 Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (INPS) is the main social security body in Italy. It was established in 1898 
with Legge 17 Luglio 1898, n 350.   
30 Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT) is the main producer of official statistics in Italy. Its activities include the census 
of population, economic censuses and several social analyses. It is member of the European Statistical System 
(coordinated by the Eurostat). 
31 Eurostat is a Directorate-General of the European Commission located in Luxembourg. Its main responsibilities are to 
provide statistical information to the institutions of the European Union and to promote the harmonisation of statistical 
methods across its member states and candidates for accession as well as EFTA countries. 
32 Eurobarometer is a series of public opinion surveys conducted on behalf of the European Commission. The 
Eurobarometer results are published by the European Commission’s Directorate-General Communication. 
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crisis of accumulation, which culminated in the 2007 global financial and economic crisis. The first 
chapter, furthermore, discusses the link between neoliberalism and new constitutionalism. It 
addresses aims, processes and legal measures that are related to this international governance 
framework. Then it identifies the legal changes that have been implemented in the EU to face the 
Eurozone crisis, by highlighting that these legal changes have reinforced the existing new 
constitutionalist framework. Moreover, it highlights the main consequence of the implementation of 
new constitutionalist measures in the EU by applying Jukka Snell’s legal analysis to the EMU. 
Finally, it examines the relationship between European Union’s regulations – associated with ‘new 
constitutionalism’ framework – and the rise of nationalist movements and parties in Europe. 
The second chapter – New Constitutionalism of Disciplinary Neoliberalism and the 
Liberalisation of the Italian Labour Market – retraces the political and social background during 
which the working statute has been conceived. The second section highlights how the current 
European Union’s system of governance has committed Italy in reviewing specific contents of the 
Law 300/1970, in order to make a favourable business climate for investors. In particular, this section 
highlights the role of the European economic governance system in shrinking the Italian decision-
making system. The third section describes contents and provisions of the Jobs Act. In the first place, 
it shows that those provisions clearly dovetail the contents of those reports conducted by the European 
Commission. In the second place, it shows that the labour market reform reflects Gill’s new 
constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism discourse. Finally, the fourth section shows the strong 
popular reaction against the Jobs Act. 
The third and final chapter – New Constitutionalism of Disciplinary Neoliberalism and the 
Neoliberal Re-Organising Logic of the Italian Institutional Framework – describes the main 
principles and contents of the Constitution of the Italian Republic. In particular, it highlights its 
antiauthoritarian and democratic spirit, coming from the backlash against Mussolini dictatorship of 
1922-1943. The second section highlights how the European economic governance framework has 
fostered the revision of the Italian institutional framework, in order to face and restore the 2007 crisis 
of capital accumulation. In particular, this section stresses that the European Union governance 
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framework has reduced the room of manoeuvre of the Italian decision-making system in envisaging 
the constitutional bill. The third section not only describes the main contents and provisions of the 
constitutional bill but also shows that those contents and provisions reflect a neoliberal re-organising 
logic of the Italian institutional arrangement, within the greater framework of Gill’s new 
constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism. Finally, the fourth section shows the link between the 
constitutional bill – associated with the ‘new constitutionalism’ framework – and the constitutional 
referendum. 
With this research, I thus attempt to analyse the reform process put in place within the EU, 
and in Italy from a new constitutionalist perspective. In particular, if the analysis concerning the 
Italian legal reform process is correct, the Jobs Act and the constitutional bill would confirm – as 
already argued by Gill concerning the European Union after the Maastricht Agreements, and the 
establishment of the EMU in 199233 – the tendency of new constitutionalist measures to shift Italy 
from a social democratic towards a neoliberal order.
                                               
33 Gill, ‘European Governance and New Constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary Union and Alternatives to 
Disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe’ (23) 5. 
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Nearly two decades ago, the political scientist Stephen Gill argued that the European Union 
(EU) needed to be comprehended as commensurate to the ‘new constitutionalism of disciplinary 
neoliberalism’ framework. More specifically, he affirmed that the Maastricht Agreements34 and the 
establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1992 sought to institutionalise a new 
currency, as well as mandate fiscal discipline in order to create a favourable business climate for 
investors and thus create capital accumulation.35 This has shifted, he argued, the EU from a social 
democratic to a neoliberal and financial model of capitalism.36 As Gill further observed in Market 
Civilization, New Constitutionalism and World Order37, however, neoliberalism is punctuated by 
systemic crises of capital accumulation which require the deepening of new constitutionalist measures 
in order to restart the process itself.38 These measures sought to remove economic policy and crisis 
management from almost any democratic pressure and popular accountability.39 What I argue here is 
that the EU’s response to face the 2007 financial and economic crisis in Europe has been to implement 
legal measures consistent with the new constitutionalist discourse, such as the 2011 revision of the 
                                               
34 Maastricht Agreements (formally, the Treaty on European Union) is an international agreement originally signed by 
12 countries of the European Community in 1992 and entered into force in 1993. The treaty created the three pillars 
structure of the EU. The first pillar – European Communities – handled economic, social and environmental policies. The 
second pillar – Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – referred to foreign policy and military issues. The third 
pillar – Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM) – dealt with co-operation in the fight against 
crime. The Treaty of Lisbon, signed by EU Member States and in 2007 and entered into force in 2009, amended the three 
pillars structure and set the distribution of competences in various policy areas between the EU and Member States as 
following: exclusive competence, shared competence, and supporting competence.    
35 Gill, ‘European Governance and New Constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary Union and Alternatives to 
Disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe’ (n 23) 8. 
36 ibid 9. 
37 Stephen Gill, ‘Market Civilization, New Constitutionalism and World Order’ in Stephen Gill and A. Claire Cutler (Ed), 
New Constitutionalism and World Order (Cambridge University Press 2014). 
38 ibid 40-41. 
39 ibid 41. 
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Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the 2013 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), and the two-pack. These legal measures, as I show below, 
have sought to maintain investors’ confidence and governments’ credibility by attempting to provide 
an appropriate business climate and thus to restart the process of capital accumulation in Europe. 
In this chapter, I will thus examine the deepening of the new constitutionalist framework in 
the EU. The first section sketches a brief history of neoliberalism. It focuses on its origins and 
definition, and also how the neoliberal form of capitalism is characterised by crises of accumulation, 
which culminated in the 2007 global financial and economic crisis. The second section discusses the 
link between neoliberalism and new constitutionalism. It addresses aims, processes and legal 
measures that are related to this international governance framework. The third section identifies the 
legal changes that have been implemented in the EU to face the Eurozone crisis, by highlighting that 
these legal changes have reinforced the existing new constitutionalist framework. The fourth section 
describes the implications of new constitutionalist measures in the EU by applying Jukka Snell’s legal 
analysis to the EMU. The final section discusses the link between the EU’s regulations – associated 
with the ‘new constitutionalism’ framework – and the rise of European nationalisms. 
As I argue in Chapter 2 and 3, the framework of new constitutionalism of disciplinary 
neoliberalism has important implications for the understanding of the labour market reform and the 
constitutional reform put in place by Matteo Renzi Government between 2014-2016. 
 
1.2. Neoliberalism: From its Origins To the 2007 Crisis of the Neoliberal Form of 
Capitalism 
Since 1980s, neoliberalism (also referred to as ‘neoliberal form of capitalism’) has become a 
mainstream concept in both academic and political debates. Yet, there is no general agreement over 
its origins and definition. According to the political scientists Taylor C. Boas and Jordan Gans-
Morse40, for instance, the origin of the term neoliberalism lies in writings of some economists and 
                                               
40 Taylor C. Boas and Jordan Gans-Morse, ‘Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan’ (2009) 
44/2 Studies in Comparative International Development <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12116-009-9040-5> 
accessed 2 December 2016. 
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legal scholars associated with the Freiburg School during the First and the Second World War.41 
During the interwar period, many western countries – in the United States of America, as well as in 
Europe – experienced a severe economic and financial crisis that convinced many scholars and 
politicians that the liberal form of capitalism was not sustainable.42 Yet a small group of ‘new’ liberals 
(inter alia, Alfred Müller-Armack, Walter Eucken, and Wilhelm Röpke)43 sought to revive the liberal 
ideology by making a complete revision of classical liberalism.44 In the first place, German 
neoliberals’ ideology – based upon the liberal notion that competition among people pushes economic 
growth – stated that the state must play an active role for the functioning of the free market. To be 
more precise, they stressed, the state must create a proper legal system which prevent powerful private 
actors to limit the freedom of competition.45 In the second place, Freiburg School economists gave 
equal importance to social values, as well as economic efficiency.46 They, indeed, stressed the need 
to pursue both social security and social justice.47 Finally, German neoliberals gave to neoliberalism 
a ‘normative ideology’48, that is to say how society should be organised around liberty and social 
values.49 It is only from the 1980s, Boas and Gans-Morse argue, that the original neoliberal ideology 
was outranked by free-market fundamentalist ideas, such as deregulation, privatisation, and a limited 
role of the state in economy.50 
An alternative interpretation of the origins and definition of neoliberalism – which helps in 
paving the way to address the hypotheses sketched in the introduction – can be found in David 
Harvey’s study.51 Harvey argues that neoliberalism found its theoretical roots in the economic and 
                                               
41 ibid 145. 
42 ibid. 
43 Alfred Müller-Armack was German professor of economics at University of Münster and University of Cologne, as 
well as member of the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU); Walter Eucken was a German economist 
and soldier; and Wilhelm Röpke was German economist and professor at University of Marburg, Instanbul University, 
and Graduate Institute of International Studies. 
44 Boas and Gans-Morse (n 40) 145.  
45 ibid 146.  
46 ibid. 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid 147. 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid 150-152. 
51 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press 2005). 
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philosophical works of Friedrich von Hayek.52;53 He explains that Hayek (along with Ludwig von 
Mises and Milton Friedman54) referred to neoliberalism as a set of free market principles of 
neoclassical economies. They were – and still are – clearly in opposition to classical economic 
proponents (such as Adam Smith, John Maynard Keynes, and Karl Marx) which advocated economic 
interventionist or, in the case of the communist ideology, planned economy.55 Based on Hayek’s main 
book, The Constitution of Liberty56, Harvey defines neoliberalism as 
  
a theory of political economy practices that human well-being can best 
be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills 
within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property 
rights, freedom markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and 
preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state 
has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also 
set up those military, defence, police, and legal structures and functions 
required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need 
be, the proper functioning of the markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist 
(in areas such land, water, education, health care, social security, or 
environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if 
necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State 
interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum 
because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough 
information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because of powerful 
interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly 
in democracies) for their own benefit.57 
                                               
52 ibid 19-20. 
53 Friedrich von Hayek was an Austrian-British economist and philosopher. In 1974, he shared the Swedish National 
Bank's Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel with Gunnar Myrdal for his work about the theory of 
money and economic fluctuations, and about the analysis of the interdependence of economic, social and institutional 
phenomena.  
54 Ludwig von Mises was an Austria-American economist. He is considered one of the major figures in the revival of the 
liberalism theory in the aftermath of the Second World War; Milton Friedman was an American economist, awarded with 
the Nobel Prize in 1976 for his research on consumption analysis, monetary history and theory, and the complexity 
of stabilisation policy. 
55 Harvey (n 51) 20-21. 
56 Friedrich von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press 1960). 
57 Harvey (n 51) 2. 
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Harvey’s understanding of neoliberalism, however, goes beyond the mere analysis of its 
political economy practices. He thus stresses that neoliberalism should be understood as a more 
articulated political project. Since the beginning, its aim was to ‘re-establish the conditions for capital 
accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites’ in the midst of the 1970s crisis of capital 
accumulation process.58;59 During those years, indeed, the Keynesian principles on both fiscal and 
economic policies – widely applied during the post-war in the United States of America, the United 
Kingdom and many other European countries – were no longer working.60 In addition to this, oil 
embargo by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)61, as well as and the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system62 worsened the capital accumulation crisis. Within this 
framework, according to Harvey, left leaning parties (such as, the Italian Communist Party, the 
Communist Party of Great Britain and even the Democratic Party in the US), and social movements 
(including, workers’ and students’ organisations) demanded social reforms and deeper economic 
interventions from governments.63 This socialist and communist ‘season’, he further observes, pushed 
economic elites and ruling classes to adopt neoliberal fiscal and economic policies in order to restart 
the process of capital accumulation, as well as to keep their political and economic positions which 
they obtained after the Second World War.64 This issue, as Harvey puts it, is well exemplified by the 
support of Chilean upper classes to the government of the general Augusto Pinochet who aimed to 
stop the democratically elected and socialist President of Chile, Salvador Allende;65 or the support of 
affluent society to the then UK Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, as well as to the then US 
                                               
58 Harvey argues that there is tension between the genuine neoliberal theory and its actual practices. For instance, he 
observes that many neoliberal practices (such as, monopoly powers and market failures) are in contrast with Hayek’s 
neoliberal theory. See: Harvey (n 51) 21.   
59 Harvey (n 51) 19. 
60 ibid 12. 
61 The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is an intergovernmental organisation funded in 1960 
in Baghdad and headquartered since 1965 in Vienna. OPEC’s goal is to harmonise the petroleum policies of its member 
states and ensure the stabilisation of the oil markets.  
62 The Bretton Woods system was a complex of monetary management established the rules for commercial and financial 
relations among the US, Canada, Western Europe. Australia and Japan from 1950s. 
63 Harvey (n 51) 12-15. 
64 ibid 15-19. 
65 ibid 7-9. 
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President, Ronald Reagan.66 Following these successful experiments not only of capital 
accumulation, but especially of class restoration, according to Harvey, the implementation of 
neoliberal fiscal and economic policies became standard among most of national states because of 
the role embodied by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). These 
international financial institutions, throughout 1980s and 1990s, became the main centres for the 
worldwide spreading and enforcement of market disciplines associated with the neoliberal form of 
capitalism.67 
The economist David Kotz68 suggests that both the United States’ administration, under 
President Reagan, and the United Kingdom’s government, under the Prime Minister Thatcher, 
applied a set of political economy measures that have created the proper conditions for the emergence 
of the 2007 global financial and economic crisis.69 These measures, Kotz argues, consist of nine 
actions: (1) deregulation of business and finance; (2) privatisation of numerous public services; (3) 
the renunciation of discretionary fiscal policy; (4) sharp reduction in the welfare state; (5) reduction 
of taxes on business and wealthy individuals; (6) undermining of trade unions and professional 
powers; (7) a shift from long-term employees to temporary and part-time workers; (8) unrestrained 
and ruthless competition; and (9) the introduction of market principles inside large corporations.70 
These political and economic measures, he argues, gave rise to three different developments that 
'contained the seeds of an eventual systemic crisis'.71 Firstly, a growing inequality between wages 
and profit, and among households; secondly, the rise of speculative and risky activities of the financial 
sectors; lastly, the emergence of ‘bubbles’.72,73  
                                               
66 ibid 22-26. 
67 ibid 29. 
68 David M. Kotz, ‘The Financial and Economic Crisis of 2008: A Systemic Crisis of Neoliberal Capitalism’ (2009) 41/3 
Review of Radical Political Economics <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0486613409335093> accessed 26 
January 2017. 
69 ibid 306-307. 
70 ibid 307. 
71 ibid. 
72 ibid. 
73 A ‘bubble’ is an economic cycle characterised by the rise of asset prices – which exceeds the asset’s intrinsic value – 
followed by a contraction.  
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The first development – growing inequality – was the product of the deregulation of specific 
sectors (such as transportation, communications, and powers), the privatisation of public services and 
the undermining of trade unions. As a result, these measures 'led to a sharp reduction in wages in 
those sectors […] and workers' bargaining power'.74 The second development – the rise of speculative 
and risky activities by financial actors – was the product of the deregulation of business and finance, 
as well as unrestrained competition. Kotz states that these measures 'freed banks and other financial 
institutions to pursue whatever financial activity would bring the highest profits'.75 The last 
development – emergence of asset bubbles – was 'the result of the first two developments'.76 These 
economic developments, as Kotz puts it, have become untenable in US. Both the financial pressure 
on households, and the fragility of the financial system increased over a period of 30 years and 
reached its climax in 2008, with the outburst of the financial and economic crisis (also refer to as 
'crisis of the neoliberal form of capitalism')77  The most striking indicators that show the impact of 
the crisis are the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the unemployment rate. The former, according 
the US Department of Treasury78, shrank by 3.7% in July 2008 and by 8.9% in October of the same 
year.79 The latter, according to a 2012 report made by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics80, reached 
its highest peak at 10% by the end of 2009 (the highest rate in US since 1982)81.  
From 2008 onwards, the spill-over of the US crisis into Europe was extremely rapid due to 
the connections of the US financial system and many European financial institutions (banks, credit 
unions, and investment banks, among others). As the legal scholar Caroline M. Bradley82 puts it, 
                                               
74 Kotz (n 68) 307. 
75 ibid. 
76 ibid. 
77 ibid 314. 
78 US Department of the Treasury, ‘The Financial Crisis Response, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ (Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, 2012) <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-
center/Documents/20120413_FinancialCrisisResponse.pdf> accessed 30 January 2017. 
79 ibid. 
80 US Bureau of Labor Statistics, ‘The Recession of 2007-2009’ (BLS Spotlight on Statistics, 2012) 
<https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2012/recession/pdf/recession_bls_spotlight.pdf> accessed 30 January 2017. 
81 ibid 2. 
82 Caroline M. Bradley, ‘From Global Financial Crisis to Sovereign Debt Crisis and Beyond: What Lies Ahead for the 
European Monetary Union?’ (2013) 22/9 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 
<https://repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=fac_articles> accessed 22 October 2018. 
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many European financial institutions, after all, were heavily implicated in the US sub-prime crisis 
and experienced huge losses.83 For this reason, she argues, European states and their central banks 
aimed to tackle monetary losses by financially supporting or, in the most severe cases, by 
nationalising financial institutions.84;85 This decision, she further argues, shifted the burden of 
financial failures on public finances of EU member states and – for most of those countries with high 
sovereign debts – the situation became unsustainable.86 For this reason, Greece (as I will show in this 
Chapter, Section 5), Spain, and Portugal sought financial assistance from the EU, the IMF, or both.87 
This uncertain economic and financial framework undermined investors’ confidence affecting capital 
inflows.88 These circumstances had a deep impact on the European Union as a whole: its GDP shrank 
by 4.3% in 200989, and the unemployment rate reached 9.7% – its peak throughout the crisis – in 
2010.90 
The following section, therefore, seeks to analyse the relation between law and neoliberalism, and – 
more specifically – how neoliberalism relies upon law to make its own 'requests' within a specific 
context. As I show, the ‘new constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism’ framework developed 
by Gill and many others legal scholars and political scientists is particularly insightful when it comes 
to explain this relationship. 
 
                                               
83 ibid 16. 
84 ibid 17. 
85 For instance, Germany, under Angela Merkel’s government, nationalised the IKB Deutsche Industriebank. Similarly, 
the UK, under Gordon Brown’s administration, bailed out the Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB and HBOS, and 
nationalised part of the Bradford and Bingley. 
86 ibid (n 82) 17-18. 
87 ibid. 
88 See: Philip R. Lane, ‘Capital Flows in the Euro Area’ (European Economy Economic Papers, 2013) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2013/pdf/ecp497_en.pdf> accessed 18 September 
2017. 
89 Eurostat, ‘National Accounts and GDP’ <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/National_accounts_and_GDP> accessed 18 September 2017. 
90 Eurostat, ‘Unemployment Statistics’ <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics> accessed 30 January 2017. 
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1.3. The Legal Dimension of Neoliberalism 
As mentioned in the previous section, the concept of neoliberalism has become central in both 
academic and political arenas. Nevertheless, as the legal scholars Matthias Goldmann and Silvia 
Steininger91 underline, law has often been ignored in the debate on neoliberalism.92 Similarly, David 
Singh Grewal and Jedediah Purdy93 argue that neoliberalism has always been mediated through law94 
and, consequently, understanding their relationship is essential.95 Filling this academic lacuna has 
become central in current legal scholarship. It is worth mentioning, for instance, that in The 
Constitutional Protection of Capitalism96, the legal scholar Danny Nicol observes that international 
law – in particular, since the end of 1970s – has constitutionalised the neoliberal ideology through 
the establishment of ‘transnational regimes’, such as the World Trade Organization97 (WTO), the EU, 
and the European Court of Human Rights98 (ECHR).99 To be more precise, these transnational 
regimes – as Nicol puts it – have the power to draft and propose regulations that rule over national 
activities which ‘were previously considered the exclusive domain of the state’.100 In addition to this, 
the WTO, the EU, and the ECHR possess more effective legal instruments to enforce such regulations 
within nation states than ever.101 For these reasons, Nicol argues, transnational regimes have 
                                               
91 Matthias Goldmann and Silvia Steininger, Democracy and Financial Order: Legal Perspective (Springer 2018). 
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93 David Singh Grewal and Jedediah Purdy, ‘Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism’ (2014) 77/1 Law and Contemporary 
Problems,<https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=true&handle=hein.journals/lcp77&div=42&start_page=1&collecti
on=journals&set_as_cursor=0&men_tab=srchresults#> accessed 14 February 2017. 
94 ibid 9. 
95 ibid. 
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importantly shrunk the room of manoeuvre of nation states ‘narrowing the scope for legitimate, 
democratic politics’.102 
A more radical proposal on the relationship between neoliberalism and law is offered by the 
legal scholars Thomas Biebricher103, and Honor Brabazon.104 Biebricher argues that this bond is so 
relevant – both at theoretical and empirical framework – that he refers to it as ‘juridical 
neoliberalism’.105 He argues, for instance, that practices of juridical neoliberalism (such as, the 2011 
balanced-budget amendment) involves two specific outcomes. In the first place, they make any law 
against the neoliberal order, simply, illegal.106 In the second place, they create a sense of 
‘moralisation’ which prevent any criticism against the neoliberal ideology.107 Even more drastically, 
Brabazon argues that neoliberalism should be considered a juridical project, in addition to an 
economic and political one.108 As a matter of fact, she argues, law not only has created a neoliberal 
order but also it has created neoliberalism itself. More specifically, Brabazon observes that 
 
(it) is not only the content of neoliberal law that has helped to create the 
neoliberal order but also the very fact that law has been used in its creation. 
It is even possible to speculate that neoliberalism might not have become so 
powerful, at the current time, or in its current form if liberal legalism had not 
enjoyed a particular degree of hegemony in the same moment as the political 
conditions of neoliberalism occurred.109 
 
Thus, in her view, law is constitutive of neoliberalism and not just an instrument through which 
neoliberalism has advanced its own demands.110  
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Section 1.3.1 covers the main features of one of the most relevant theoretical frameworks with regards 
to the relationship between neoliberalism and law, namely Stephen Gill’s new constitutionalism of 
disciplinary neoliberalism.   
 
1.3.1. New Constitutionalism of Disciplinary Neoliberalism 
As underlined in the previous section, some legal scholars and political scientists have pointed 
out the relevance of law within the neoliberal argument. A notable theoretical framework that helps 
in understanding such relationship and, more specifically, the role of law to create and preserve the 
neoliberal order is the ‘new constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism’ discourse, theorised by 
the political scientists Stephen Gill, often writing in collaboration with A. Claire Cutler.  According 
to Gill, ‘new constitutionalism’ is the politico-legal mechanism associated with the neoliberal 
restructuring of the world order.111 They thus argues that ‘new constitutionalism’ operates to create 
and preserve a neoliberal order, and to provide favourable legal and other protections for investors112 
so embedded in international and national laws that any attempt to change or challenge the rules 
themselves is very difficult. To put it in other words, the legal framework that Gill describes in terms 
of new constitutionalism seeks to maintain confidence of investors and credibility of governments by 
attempting to provide an appropriate business climate and thus to generate capital accumulation.113 
To this purpose, new constitutionalist measures insulate dominant economic forces from democratic 
pressure and popular accountability, as well as institutionalise the liberalisation of markets for capital, 
goods, and labour. The former seeks to make any political backlash against the neoliberal form of 
capitalism hard to achieve.114 The latter seek to generate economic growth and extend capital 
accumulation.115 
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More specifically, Gill and Cutler refer to the new constitutionalism of disciplinary 
neoliberalism as a combination of different processes: (1) ‘the uneven emergence of a de facto 
constitutional governance structure for the world market (intended to operate regionally, nationally 
and globally) involving the interaction of public and private power, incorporating international 
organisations’;116 (2) ‘the neo-liberal reshaping of political subjects and restructuring of particular 
state forms, partly through constitutional and legal means, extending the orbit and interpellation of 
the commodity form and its legal codification, in order to extend capitalist markets and the sway of 
market forces in social and political life’;117 (3) ‘the specific locking-in mechanisms (laws, rules, 
regulations, procedures and institutions, such as independent central banks) associated with neo-
liberal patterns of accumulation’;118 (4) and ‘the “new informality” involving proliferation of soft, 
self-regulatory and “flexible” or “double” legal standards’.119 
These processes involve different sets of measures – or what Gill names ‘productive 
constraints’120 – which shape the neoliberal governance of political economy. These measures consist 
of: those to reconfigure state apparatuses, those to construct and extend capital markets, and those for 
dealing with dislocations and contradictions of the neoliberal form of capitalism. Firstly, measures to 
reconfigure state apparatuses primarily separate economics from politics in order to avoid any 
popular-democratic or parliamentary backlash against neoliberal policies. As Gill notes, this is 
possible via specific legal mechanisms such as federalism and multilevel governance, which entail 
the separation of powers, both vertical (such as supranational and national levels) and horizontal 
(including the executive, legislature and judiciary branches).121  
As Adam Harmes122 notes, neoliberalism contains a normative project for multilevel 
governance typical of the American institutional framework.123 More specifically, he argues that 
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multilevel governance (also referred to as market-preserving federalism)124 is based on two main 
principles which determine law-making capabilities of both supranational and national levels.125 The 
first principle refers to the necessity to centralise, at the supranational level, those policies that have 
a positive impact on capital accumulation, such as property rights and/or extension of markets.126 As 
a consequence, nation-states do not possess the ability to interfere with the process of capital 
accumulation. The second principle refers to the necessity to decentralise, at the national level, those 
policies that the neoliberal form of capitalism does not support, for instance both redistributive taxing 
and social programmes.127 Similarly, Saskia Sassen128 asserts that the neoliberal project entails the 
shift of specific powers and norm-making capacities from national to supranational level on both 
macroeconomic (such as, financial and monetary) and microeconomic policies (including, labour and 
pension).129 As a consequence, she argues, supranational institutions now are able to set the criteria 
for proper national policies, and – in the most severe cases – to force nation-states to adopt and 
implement specific measures, without any popular pressure and democratic accountability.130 Neil 
Brenner, Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore131 illustrate this point clearly. They thus argue that multilevel 
governance associated with the neoliberal project entails a ‘U-turn’ in the relationship between 
supranational and national, shifting the relationship itself from a bottom-up to a top-down model. 
Owing to this, they assert that supranational institutions – inter alia, the EU, the IMF, and the World 
Bank – are able to impose market disciplines on national states aiming to create those legal conditions 
necessary to extend and accelerate capital accumulation.132   
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Not only the vertical, but also the horizontal separation of powers is pivotal in the neoliberal 
project. A significant analysis and discussion on this argument is presented by Sassen. In particular, 
she disagrees with the common idea that the neoliberalisation process simply tends to empower 
supranational actors to the detriment of nation-states.133 By contrast, she argues that this process 
redistributes power also from parliamentary institutions (such as, parliaments and courts) towards 
executive apparatuses (including, governments, central banks, and ministries of finance), shifting 
nation-states from a liberal to a neoliberal form of state.134 In her view, thus, executive branches are 
constitutive of the neoliberal re-organising logic. This is because executive apparatuses now play an 
important role for two different, yet nonconflicting reasons: in the first place, supranational actors 
(such as the EU, and the IMF) negotiate the content of neoliberal measures exclusively with executive 
apparatuses,135 in the second place the executive owns the institutional powers to enable those 
measures within national borders.136 Owing to this, governments are strictly intertwined with 
supranational organisations in supporting the neoliberal project.137 Sassen notes that this process took 
place between since 1980s and it is an ongoing transformation in a growing number of states (inter 
alia, the United States of America).138 
Secondly, new constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism involves measures to construct 
and extend capitalist markets (as I will show in Chapter 2). These measures, in particular, seek to 
institutionalise economic policies which involve the liberalisation and extensions of capital, labour, 
and goods in order to permit extended capital accumulation.139 This consists, as Gill notes, in 
rewriting laws and statutes.140 This set of new constitutionalist measures thus is justified on grounds 
that specific labour market institutions – such as, employment protections, union density, bargaining 
coordination, benefits, and labour tax wedge – prevent a quick and efficient allocation of factors 
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(including, human and capital resources) affecting economic growth and thus capital accumulation. 
For instance, the economists Tito Boeri141 and Pietro Garibaldi142 argue that dismissal protections 
prevent an efficient shift of human resources from less productive to more productive sectors.143 
Along the same lines, the economist Edward Lazear144 states that large unemployment benefits would 
reduce the employment rate, since social benefits would disincentive workers to find another job.145 
Finally, as argued by Stefano Scarpetta146 and Thierry Tressel147, high costs of dismissal affect firms’ 
willingness to adopt and implement new technologies.148 
Many other economists, however, critically assess the thesis that the removal of employment 
protections has a positive impact upon competitiveness and thus economic growth. For instance, a 
significant analysis and discussion on this argument is presented by Dean Baker, Andrew Glyn, David 
Howell, and John Schmitt. They thus support the general idea that there is not any evident link 
between the pattern of deregulation – implemented in the 1990s – and trends in unemployment 
rates.149 In addition to this, they suggest that there is not any evidence of correlation between labour 
market institutions and rates of unemployment.150 Similarly, Klaus Armingeon and Lucio Baccaro do 
not find in their data and administrative analysis any relationship between employment protections 
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and levels of unemployment.151 Within this context, Peck and Theodore argue that the deregulation 
of the labour market has led to the rise of a specific social figure, that is to contingent workers. Since 
1990s, as they note, employers have favoured the adoption of contingent work strategies in order to 
cut labour costs, as well as to keep away from legal liabilities usually associated with ‘regular’ 
workers.152 In doing so, labour market restructuring has made workers precarious and insecure, 
employed on an as-needed basis, without any social security right, as well as low, irregular and 
insecure pay.153 
The third set of measures which, according to Gill, seek to deal with dislocations and 
contradictions of the contemporary economic system, that is to say crises of capital accumulation.154 
In the first place, this is achievable by maintaining the separation of the economics from popular 
accountability and democratic pressure. In doing so, neoliberal leaders are free to manage the crisis.155 
In the second place, by the co-optation of international and national political threats to the neoliberal 
order. This is reflected, Gill argues, in those conservative, liberal, and even social democratic parties 
which are amenable to adopt and/or deepen neoliberal reforms in their political systems.156 Finally, 
by the presentation of economic issues as merely ‘technical questions beyond political 
contestability’.157 
Having clarified what ‘new constitutionalism’ means in a general sense, the next section now 
turns to the task of identifying the legal changes that have been implemented in the European Union, 
specifically, in order to confront what I referred to as the 2007 crisis of the neoliberal model of 
                                               
151 Klaus Armingeon and Lucio Baccaro, ‘Do Labor Market Liberalization Reforms Pay Off?’ (2012) University of 
Geneva, 22-28 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267842361_Do_Labor_Market_Liberalization_Reforms_Pay_Off> accessed 
2 July 2017. 
152 Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore, ‘Politicizing Contingent Work: Countering Neoliberal Labor Market Regulation…from 
the Bottom Up?’ (2012) 111/4 The South Atlantic Quarterly, 742 <https://read.dukeupress.edu/south-atlantic-
quarterly/article-abstract/111/4/741/3607/Politicizing-Contingent-Work-Countering-Neoliberal> accessed 10 July 2017. 
153 ibid 744-745. 
154 Gill (n 37) 40. 




capitalism. In particular, it will be argued that these legal changes have reinforced Gill’s new 
constitutionalist discourse in the European Union and its neoliberal governance in particular. 
 
1.4. New Constitutionalism and the European Union: Neoliberal Governance 
from the 1992 Maastricht Agreements to the 2007 Crisis of the Neoliberal Form 
of Capitalism 
As shown above, drawing on the work of Gill, Cutler, and others, ‘new constitutionalism’ 
refers to a legal system which is designed to create and preserve a neoliberal order which generate 
capital accumulation, and provide legal protections for dominant economic forces. According to Gill, 
the European Union – since the Maastricht Agreement and the establishment of the Economic and 
Monetary Union in 1992 – aimed to provide and maintain a neoliberal order by institutionalising a 
new currency, and in doing so to mandate fiscal discipline upon Eurozone member countries.158 For 
these reasons, Gill understands the EU as commensurate with the new constitutionalism of 
disciplinary neoliberalism discourse. 159  
Specifically, Gill notes that the logic of the European political and economic union is premised 
on a specific set of principles. These principles consist of: sound policy, debt sustainability, 
surveillance and normalisation, attenuation of democracy, and prioritisation of market efficiency.160 
In the first place, EU requires that Eurozone member-states adopt and implement ‘sound policy’ 
measures.161 This means that Eurozone member-states must undertake political economy measures 
which maintain their national deficits ‘sustainable’ and, as a consequence, keep low inflation.162 In 
the second place, the EU puts consistently under surveillance and monitoring governments’ policies 
in order to avoid any deviation from the neoliberal discourse.163 The fourth element is the attenuation 
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of democracy. Gill notes that the normalisation of the neoliberal discourse in Europe requires legal 
means which attenuate, or even suppress, any political backlash against the neoliberal ideology.164 
Finally, the European political and economic union prioritises market efficiency over equity, 
involving social uncertainty and insecurity.165 As Gill has put it, the compliance with neoliberal 
principles provoke the erosion of other forms of social solidarity.166 This form of governance, in 
Gill’s terms, ‘has shifted the European Union towards a neoliberal and financial, as opposed to a 
social market or social democratic, model of capitalism.’167 
As I have shown in the first section of this chapter, however, the 2007 crisis of the neoliberal 
form of capitalism has caused the business climate in the EU to deteriorate. Consistently with Gill’s 
new constitutionalist discourse, the EU’s response to this crisis has focused on restoring confidence 
to investors and credibility to governments and, as a consequence, capital accumulation. This 
approach is exemplified in the words of the President of the ECB, then Jean-Claude Trichet, at the 
European American Press Club in 2009.168 In this occasion, he argued that 
 
The intensification of the financial crisis […] was triggered by an abrupt loss 
of confidence striking simultaneously the financial system as well as the real 
economy, the industrialised countries as well as the emerging economies. 
Improving confidence is one of the necessary conditions to overcome the 
present woes. The European Central Bank and the Governing Council do 
everything to preserve, enhance, strengthen confidence. More than ever our 
institution has to be an anchor for stability, therefore an anchor for 
confidence, in these uncharted and turbulent waters.169 
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To this purpose, Trichet called for legal reforms in order to rejuvenate the EU’s economic 
governance structures.170 As he described, these reforms consisted of 
 
First, all surveillance procedures have to be faster and more automatic, 
including the new macroeconomic surveillance framework. […] Second, the 
enforcement tools also need to be more effective. For example, the new 
macroeconomic surveillance framework needs to provide clear incentives by 
envisaging financial sanctions already after the first instance of non-
compliance. Discretion to reduce or suspend financial sanctions – either on 
grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or in response to a reasoned 
request by a Member State – strongly reduces the effectiveness and sets the 
wrong incentives. Third, the policy requirements should be more ambitious 
to match the current reality of the euro area […] As regards fiscal 
surveillance, ambitious benchmarks are needed when establishing an 
excessive deficit […] Fourth and finally, it is also crucial to guarantee the 
quality of and independence of fiscal and economic analysis. We proposed 
the establishment of an EU advisory body of recognised competence.171 
 
Not only the imposition of fiscal discipline, but also the implementation of structural reforms 
by Eurozone member states is pivotal to provide a favourable business climate and thus restore capital 
accumulation. This argument seems to be evident in the words said by the President of the ECB, 
Mario Draghi, during a conference held at the Brookings Institution in Washington. In particular, he 
stated as following 
 
Put simply, I cannot see any way out of the crisis unless we create more 
confidence in the future potential of our economies […]. Governments in the 
euro area know well what they need to do to achieve this objective. They do 
not need our advice. They simply need to implement their specific national 
structural reforms. And the more vigorously they do this, the more credible 
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an increase in growth potential will become, and the more quickly business 
and consumer confidence will return to the euro area.172 
 
In line with these recommendations, the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of the 
European Union voted and adopted specific regulations, with profound effects on the European 
Union’s system of economic governance. These legal instruments consisted of: the 2011 revisions of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 173 as well as the 2013 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) and two regulations (also refer to as ‘two-
pack’).174 The Stability and Growth Pact, the Fiscal Stability Treaty, and the two-pack thus establish 
– in the context of the European Semester – the obligation that national budgets of contracting parties 
should be balanced or in surplus in order to keep low inflation and, thus, to maintain a favourable 
business climate for investors. The obligation is met when a contracting party has a structural deficit 
of no more than 0.5% Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which is up to 1% if the debt ratio is below 
60% GDP.175 The European Commission operates to ensure compliance with such fiscal discipline. 
Every year, the executive cabinet of the European Union conducts an Annual Growth Survey (AGS) 
concerning the economic performances and goals of the European Union as a whole, as well as 
Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs) which include a detailed analysis of each country’s plans 
for budget, macroeconomic and structural reforms. For their part, contracting parties submit National 
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Reform Programmes (NRPs) which include the contents of structural reforms necessary to meet both 
financial and economic parameters. These programmes are taken into account in the Country-Specific 
Recommendations, as well as the meeting between the European Commission and each country.176 
In case a contracting party does not meet the above-mentioned parameters, the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) is automatically activated. The MIP thus aims to 
identify, prevent and address macroeconomic imbalances that could affect contracting parties’ 
economic growth, or the European Union as a whole. The starting point of the Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure is the European Commission’s Alert Mechanism Report (AMR), which analyse 
the economic outlook of all contracting parties. Countries whose financial and economic situation 
requires deeper analysis are subject to In-Depth Reviews (IDRs) by the Directorate-General of 
Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) in the European Commission. If the DG ECFIN finds 
macroeconomic imbalances, its staff enters into dialogue with national governments and makes 
recommendations in order to boost economic growth. In case of excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances, the European Commission activates the Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP) which 
requires the submission of a corrective action plan to address challenges. In case the European Union 
member-state – facing any type of imbalances – fails to meet the obligations, the Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure imposes automatic financial sanctions.177  
The EU’s system of economic governance also encompasses the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM). This legal instrument involves a cash-for-reforms approach for over-indebted 
countries. That is to say, over-indebted countries receive a loan in exchange for specific 
macroeconomic and structural reforms. The contents of the economic reforms are listed in 
Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) agreed by the country itself, and the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (also known as 
Troika). It worth mentioning the significant role of the IMF within the European Union economic 
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governance. Since the 2007 crisis global crisis of capital accumulation, the IMF has worked in 
cooperation with the EC and the ECB. It provides regular consultations, as well as technical assistance 
in several areas. These consist of: monetary and exchange rate policies, financial sector supervision 
and stability, trade and cross-border capital flows, and structural policies. 178 
What is argued here is that – consistently with the ‘new constitutionalism’ framework – the 
current system of governance reflects the strengthening of the European Union’s legal capacity to 
enforce financial and economic measures associated with the neoliberal ideology. More specifically, 
the economic governance framework commits contracting parties to implement specific legal 
measures to restore a favourable business climate for investors and thus to restart the process of 
capital accumulation in Europe. What is more, in case of non-fulfilment of obligations and or 
recommendations, the EU possesses monitoring and corrective mechanisms which address any 
deviation from the neoliberal governance of the European Union.   
The next section describes the main consequences of the latest revisions of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, the Fiscal Stability Treaty and the two-pack on contracting parties. The combination of 
such hard and soft laws thus has involved the erosion of national democratic decision-making 
processes, as well as the erosion of economic and social rights. 
 
1.5. The Consequences of Post-2007 New Constitutionalism in the European 
Union 
As I previously argued, the European Union – since the 2011 Stability and Growth Pact, the 
2013 Fiscal Stability Treaty, and the two-pack – possesses specific legal instruments to create and 
lock-in a favourable business climate for investors, and thus generate capital accumulation. What it 
is argued here is that the European Union’s system of economic governance has severely eroded 
democratic decision-making process of contracting parties. This issue is well exemplified in Jukka 
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Snell’s179 adaptation of Dani Rodrik’s ‘trilemma of globalisation’.180 According to Rodrik’s 
'trilemma', it is not possible to seek a combination of international economic integration, nation-states 
(national sovereignty) and mass politics (democracy) within a specific national jurisdiction. 
Therefore, he argues, it is possible to choose only two out of the three elements: such as international 
economic integration and nation-states, or international economic integration and mass politics, or 
nation-states and mass politics.181 Within this context, Rodrik argues that 
 
[The] Golden Straitjacket narrows the political and economic choice of those 
in power to relatively tight parameters. [...] Once your country puts on the 
Golden Straitjacket, its political choices get reduced to Pepsi or Coke - to 
slight nuances of tastes, slight nuances of policy, slight alterations in design 
to account for local traditions, some loosening here or there, but never any 
major deviation from the core golden rules.182 
 
According to Snell – via the implementation of the 2011 revision of the Stability and Growth 
Pact, the 2013 Fiscal Stability Treaty and the two-pack183 – the EU should be understood as a politico-
legal framework which, in Rodrik’s terms, have opted for international economic integration and 
nation-states, leaving ‘mass politics’ or democracy behind. In particular, these legal measures – which 
not only have imposed constraints on nation-states to ensure that national budgets remain within 
specific parameters, but also and have reinforced monitoring and sanctioning powers of supranational 
institutions – have limited 'what domestic mass politics can decide'.184 More specifically, the above-
mentioned regulations have reduced the ability of Eurozone member states to implement diverging 
national policies to the extent that their national domestic decision-making processes are kept only in 
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appearance.185 As a result, as Snell further argues, 'whichever party or parties is in power, policies 
are going to be fairly similar'.186 
The evidence of such restriction of democratic decision-making process of Eurozone member-
states can be clearly seen in the case of what the mainstream economic literature calls the 'Greek 
government-debt crisis’ (also refer to as 'Greek depression'). The most specific illustration’s concerns 
Greece’s 2015 general election and the popular referendum, called to decide whether Greece was to 
accept the bailout conditions included in the Memorandum of Understandings proposed within the 
European Stability System in the wake of the 2007 crisis (as discussed in the previous section). The 
Greek crisis began in earnest after the national election in 2009 and the disclosure of the real data on 
government debt levels187, which showed the deficit at 12.7% of the GDP in 2009 and the national 
debt at 125% of the GDP in 2010.188 Consequently, the ESM obliged Greece to enact specific legal 
reforms to remedy the economic ‘imbalances’ and make its deficit more ‘sustainable’. Within this 
context, the Troika launched a €110 billion bailout loan to rescue Greece from sovereign default and 
cover its financial needs, conditional on the implementation of structural reforms, and privatisation 
of governments assets.189 In spite of the implementation of such measures, the financial and economic 
conditions worsened. The result was that Greece needed also a second loan (€130 billion in 2011).190 
In January 2015 – after the legislative election to elect all 300 members of the Hellenic 
Parliament – the Coalition of the Radical Left - Syriza won the election with the 36.34% of voters 
(the 27.81% voted for the ND), securing 149 out of the 300 seats. The Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, 
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during the national campaign was firmly critical towards the Troika’s legal measures.191 In particular, 
he called for a series of national interventions to stop austerity and foster national growth. These 
were: (1) writing-off the greater part of public debt's nominal value, in order to make it sustainable; 
(2) a significant grace period in debt servicing to save funds for growth; (3) excluding public 
investment from restriction of the SGP; (4) a 'European New Deal' financed by the European 
Investment Bank (EIB).  
In June, the President of the EC, Jean-Claude Junker, the IMF and the ECB published a list of 
further action to be taken by the Greek government, such as fiscal structural reforms, pension and 
labour reforms, and public administration reforms.192 As a result, the government broke off the 
negotiations and announced a popular referendum to decide whether Greece was to decide the 
proposal proposed by the above-mentioned supranational organisations.193 On July 5, the bailout 
conditions were rejected by the 61% of Greek (39% voted in favour of it).194 The Greek Prime 
Minister, however, buckled under the pressure made by creditors’ deadlines195, and reached an 
agreement over the content of the third economic adjustment programme with the Troika, which 
further privatisation and liberalisation of public services, cuts of public expenditures and radical 
reforms.196  
The Greek case well exemplifies the erosion of democratic decision-making process of 
Eurozone member-states. Specifically – drawing from Snell’s analysis – it is possible to argue that 
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the ability of Eurozone member-states to respond to democratic instances of their people has been 
reduced 'close to zero'.  
The erosion of the democratic decision-making process of Eurozone member states like 
Greece and (as I show in the following two chapters) Italy and others, however, is only one side of 
the coin. The implementation of legal reforms based on neoliberal assumptions has been severely 
criticised in terms of the heavy social cost. The economist Paul Krugman has argued, on this basis, 
that ‘in the face of the economic crisis, austerity has been a failure everywhere it has been tried’.197 
More recently, Joseph Stiglitz referred to the austerity as an ‘utter and unmitigated disaster’.198 
Indeed, many analyses have shown that ‘the ability of individuals to exercise their human rights, and 
that of States to fulfil their obligations to protect those rights, has been diminished. This is particularly 
true for the vulnerable and marginalized groups in society, including women, children, minorities, 
migrants and the poor […]’.199 Therefore, the making of such environments ‘have dismantled the 
mechanisms that reduce inequality and enable equitable growth. The poorest have been hit hardest, 
as the burden of responsibility for the excess of past decades is passed to those most vulnerable and 
least to blame’.200 Sound market policies thus have had a negative impact on the right to work, the 
right to education and the right to healthcare – all which are guaranteed by both international treaties 
and national constitutions. 
The ‘zombie neo-liberalization’ scenario sketched by Brenner, Peck and Theodore is a good 
illustration of the extension of the new constitutionalist framework, via the implementation of the 
above-mentioned legal measures I discussed above.201 In their scenario, in spite of ‘its disruptive, 
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destructive consequences’202, the imposition of market-disciplinary parameters at both global and 
local levels remains strong.203 More specifically, ‘policy agendas continue to be subordinated to the 
priority of maintaining investor confidence and a “good business climate”; and policy agenda such 
as free trade, privatization, flexible labour markets and urban territorial competitiveness continue to 
be taken for granted’.204 
As I show in the following section, the erosion of both democratic decision-making processes and 
social rights within Eurozone member-states has also had significant political consequences. Most 
obviously, it has provoked the rise (or reinvigoration) of Eurosceptic parties and movements across 
Europe, posing a threat to the entire European Union. 
 
1.6. New Constitutionalism's challenge. The Relevance of Eurosceptic Parties 
During the 2007 Eurozone Financial and Economic Crisis 
Although scholars argue that the Euroscepticism towards the European Union integration is a 
permanent phenomenon since the Maastricht Treaties in 1992205, the erosion of both political and 
social rights has provoked what Gill and Cutler refer to as ‘disintegration’ of the EU.206 What is 
argued here is that the risk of ‘disintegration’ has been proven by the increasing relevance of old and 
new eurosceptic parties and movements across Europe in the aftermath of the 2011 Eurozone 
financial and economic crisis. These include the Dansk Folkeparti (DF) in Denmark, the Partij voor 
de Vrijheid (PVV) in Netherland, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, the Freiheitlich 
Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) in Austria, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in Great Britain, the Front 
National (FN) in France, the ‘Lega Nord’ and the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) in Italy, the ‘Syriza’ 
and the ‘Popular Association – Golden Dawn’ in Greece, and many others. 
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According to the mainstream political science literature207, these eurosceptic parties and 
movements – from both the left and right wings of the political spectrum – cover ‘a wide range of 
[political] positions’.208 They fear the impact of the economic integration on national social rights, as 
well as the impact of the EU framework on national sovereignty (exemplified by the shift of 
competences from the national to the supranational level).209 As a result, they both call for major 
reforms within the EU institutions or, in the most extreme cases, for ‘an exit from the eurozone or 
even from the EU’.210 This argument is further highlighted by the political scientist, Maria Daniela 
Poli. She, thus, states that these parties – albeit to varying degrees – seek to change the EU framework 
and its legal measures.211 
Further evidence of the increasing influence that both old and new eurosceptic political parties 
and movements are having in the wake of the 2007 crisis, and the EU’s austerity-driven response to 
it can also be seen in the 2014 European Parliamentary election.212 The result attested the electoral 
success of eurosceptic parties and movements – from the left-right political spectrum – with an overall 
size of the group increased to more than 100 MEPs (e.g. European Conservatives and Reformists 
(ECR), European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), and Europe for Freedom and Direct 
Democracy Group (EFDD)) to the detriment of the main three pro-EU parties (e.g. Group of the 
European People’s Party (EPP), Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the 
European Parliament (S&D), and Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)).  
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However, as Brack and Startin further state, ‘EU-related referendums have become a key 
feature of this [eurosceptic] mainstream process […]. Nowhere is this currently more pronounced 
than in UK’.213 The risk of the EU’s ‘disintegration’ can therefore be understood as having reached 
its peak in 2016 after the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the EU (after the popular 
referendum held in Great Britain in 2016214). According to George Monbiot, the neoliberal character 
of the EU has destroyed ‘effective […] democratic power’215. As such, the ‘Leave’ campaign during 
the UK referendum sought to fill this lack of democracy by promoting the exciting idea to take back 
national sovereignty from European institutions. As a consequence, the combination of these 
elements ‘have led people to look for an alternative to politics, and instead of seeking to solve issues 
through political arguments and debates, looking for slogans, symbols and sensations instead’.216 
Along the same lines, the economist Paul De Grauwe agrees and stresses that the causes of 
this event are the ‘lack of democratic accountability in the decision-making process at the European 
level’217 and, even more importantly, the adoption of a ‘uniquely neo-liberal discourse’.218 Further, 
austerity and structural reforms have thus pushed all Eurozone member states ‘into an austerity 
straightjacket’219 that has produced economic stagnation, and erosion of the social security (low 
wages and quick dismissals).220 
The rise of social movements and political organisations, however, has been investigated by 
Brenner, Peck and Theodore, before the outburst of the Eurozone financial and economic crisis. In 
the ‘disarticulated counter-neo-liberalization’ scenario, they argue the financial and economic crisis 
offers to social movements and political organisations new possibilities to promote counter-neoliberal 
reforms.221 However, the ‘new constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism’ framework remains 
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sturdy since the ‘such counter-neo-liberalizing projects remain disarticulated – they are largely 
confined to localized or nationalized parameters while still being embedded within geo-institutional 
contexts that are dominated by market-disciplinary regulatory arrangements and policy-transfer 
networks’222 
Having said that, it is still an open question whether the EU decides to abandon some of these 
regulations – consistent with the Gill’s ‘new constitutionalism’ – or, as argued by Gill and Cutler, 
face the disintegration of the EU. 
 
1. 7. Conclusion 
The present chapter was designed to critically analyse the 2011 Stability and Growth Pact, the 
2013 Fiscal Stability Treaty, and the two-pack within the European Union from Gill’s ‘new 
constitutionalism’ perspective. Within this context, very important implications came into view. In 
the first place, the above-mentioned regulations have strengthened European Union’s legal capacity 
to enforce financial and economic measures associated with the neoliberal ideology. More 
specifically, the European Union – through its system of governance – is able to commit contracting 
parties to implement specific legal measures to restore a favourable business climate for investors 
and thus to restart the process of capital accumulation in Europe. What is more, in case of non-
fulfilment of obligations and or recommendations, the EU possesses monitoring and corrective 
mechanisms which address any deviation from the neoliberal governance of the European Union. 
In the second place, the erosion of the democratic decision-making process of Eurozone 
member states – like Greece – is only one side of the coin. The implementation of legal reforms based 
on neoliberal assumptions has been severely criticised in terms of the heavy social cost. As a 
consequence, this crisis has been proved by the rise of eurosceptic parties and political movements 
across European countries, as seen in the European elections in 2014, and after the UK referendum 
in 2016.  In particular, these political movements have sought to get back national control over 
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political and economic policy that during last years has moved away from 'national' towards 'global' 
dimension.  
This chapter tried to show that Gill’s assumption concerning the European Union as a 
neoliberal order is still valid. Actually, it is even possible to argue that the European Union – through 
its system of governance – now possesses, like never before, effective monitoring and sanctioning 
instruments able to ensure compliance of its member-states. This argument will be further supported 
by the next two chapters of the thesis. I will thus argue that the European Union has committed the 
Renzi Government to implement a neoliberal restructuring of the labour market (see Chapter 2), as 
well as the institutional framework (see Chapter 3).
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2. New Constitutionalism and the Italian Labour Market Reform. A 
Neoliberal Labour Market Restructuring 
 
2. 1. Introduction 
On 16 December 2014, the Italian Parliament voted and implemented the Law 183/2014 (also 
known as ‘Jobs Act’) proposed by the then Italian Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, and the then 
Minister of Labour, Giuliano Poletti. The Jobs Act softened specific labour regulations of the Law 
300/1970 (commonly known as ‘Workers’ Statute’) comprehended as market ‘rigidities’, in order to 
tackle the rise of the unemployment rate during the 2007 Eurozone crisis. Although many scholars 
have conducted important studies and analyses, if we examine the Jobs Act from a ‘new 
constitutionalism’ perspective over very important implications of the labour market reform come 
into view. In this chapter, I will thus argue that the European Union – since the 2011 Stability and 
Growth Pact, the Fiscal Stability Treaty, and the two-pack – has committed the Renzi Government in 
revising specific contents of the 1970 Workers’ Statute. In addition to this, I will argue that the 
contents of the Jobs Act reflect a neoliberal logic of the labour market system in Italy.   
In order to justify this argument, I will first make a brief overview of legal changes 
implemented in Italy before the deep reform of the European Union’s system of governance (as I 
showed in Chapter 1). Following, the first section describes the main principles and provisions of the 
Workers’ Statute. In particular, it retraces the political and social background during which the 
working statute has been conceived. The second section highlights how European Union – through 
its system of governance – has committed the Renzi Cabinet to review specific contents of the Law 
Workers’ Statute, aiming to make a favourable business climate for investors. In particular, this 
section highlights the role of the European economic governance system in shrinking the Italian 
decision-making system. The third section describes contents and provisions of the Jobs Act. Firstly, 
it shows that those provisions clearly dovetail the contents of those reports conducted by the European 
Commission. Secondly, it shows that the labour market reform reflects Gill’s new constitutionalism 
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of disciplinary neoliberalism discourse. Finally, the fourth section shows the strong popular reaction 
against the Jobs Act. 
 
2. 2.  Italy in the Midst of the 2007 Eurozone Financial and Economic Crisis  
Before going into detail of the contents of the labour market reform, for the purpose of the 
critical analysis presented here, it is useful to understand the economic and social conditions, as well 
as the legal reforms that had been implemented in the wake of the 2007 crisis in Italy. The crisis thus 
deeply affected Italy’s economic and social performances. More specifically, economic data shows 
that the Gross Domestic Product shrank by 1.1% in 2008, and by 5.5% in 2009.223 The overall 
economic picture got even worse between 2012-2013, during which the Gross Domestic Product 
shrank respectively by 2.8% in 2012 and by 1.7% in 2013.224  
Within this context, the European Union started a strict dialogue - both confidentially and 
publicly – with the Italian Government in order to tackle the weak financial and economic 
performances during the crisis. For instance, on 5 August 2011, the European Central Bank’s former 
president Jean-Claude Trichet, and the Bank’s president in pectore, Mario Draghi, sent to the then 
Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, a confidential letter225 (the content of which was leaked to 
the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera). In the first place, the letter stressed the urgency to 
underpin the standing of Italian commitment to fiscal sustainability and structural reforms, in order 
to restore the confidence of investors.226 To this purpose, the European Central Bank listed a series 
of legal measures which included both monetary and fiscal policies, and labour market and 
institutional reforms. The former, as Trichet and Draghi have put it, is particularly relevant to improve 
potential growth of the Italian economy. This refers to 
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the collective wage bargaining system allowing firm-level agreements to 
tailor wages and working conditions to firms’ specific needs and increasing 
their relevance with respect to other layers of negotiations. […] A thorough 
review of the rules regulating the hiring and the dismissal of employees 
should be adopted in conjunction of with the establishment of an 
unemployment insurance system and a set of active labour market policies 
capable of easing the reallocation of resources towards the more competitive 
firms and sectors.227 
 
The latter, as further argued by Trichet and Draghi, is pivotal to improve administrative 
efficiency and business friendliness. Specifically, they encouraged the government 
  
[…] to immediately take measures to ensure a major overhaul of the public 
administration in order to improve administrative efficiency and business 
friendliness. In public entities the use of performance indicators should be 
systemic […]. There is a need for strong commitment to abolish or 
consolidate some intermediary administrative layers (such as the provinces). 
 
In the face of the ongoing economic crisis and the failure of attempts to solve via economic 
and social policy measures, Berlusconi resigned as Prime Minister on 16 November 2011 in favour 
of Mario Monti228, which – to put it in Tony Barber’s terms – ‘is revered in Brussels as one of the 
most effective commissioners for competition and the internal market that the EU has known’.229 
Mario Monti was nominated by the President of the Italian Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, and voted 
in by the Members of Parliament. The approach of the Monti Cabinet was characterised by the partial 
implementation of the economic policies listed in above-mentioned letter, among many other pension 
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system and labour market reforms. The Law 214/2011230 – proposed by the then Minister of Labour, 
Social Policies and Gender Equality, Elsa Fornero231 – raised the pensionable age and requirements 
for retirement on the basis of the number of years of social security contributions made, meeting the 
conditions of the ECB letter ‘to intervene further in the pension system, making more stringent the 
eligibility criteria for seniority pensions and rapidly aligning the retirement age of women in the 
private sector to that established for public employees’.232  
Labour reform went in the same direction. With the Law 92/2012233 (also referred to as ‘Legge 
Fornero’), Monti Government softened some dispositions of the Workers’ Statute and in particular 
Art. 18 which protects workers – employed with open-ended contracts – from illegal and/or invalid 
dismissals. modified Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute to review 'the rules regulating the hiring and 
dismissal of employees'.234 Specifically, it allowed both public and private companies to give out a 
compensation payment if they had laid off their employees, for disciplinary or economic reasons, in 
a manner that was considered illegitimate or unjustified. In this case, companies were no longer forced 
to automatically reinstate their employees if their dismissal had been proved to be 'illegal’ unless the 
court ordered otherwise. The implementation of pension system, as well as labour market reforms 
has been severely criticised in terms of the heavy social cost. Quantitative data thus shows that 
between 2008-2016 people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in Italy raised from the 25.5% to 
28.7%.235  
In the following section, I will describe the further legal changes that have been implemented 
in Italy, by Renzi Cabinet, within the current European Union’s system of governance. 
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2.3. The Law that Brought the Constitution of the Italian Republic into the 
Factories 
Having briefly described the economic and social outlook in Italy in the midst of the financial 
and economic crisis, this section describes the provisions, as well as the historical background of the 
main document that mediates the relationship between workers, companies, trade unions and the 
government. The Workers’ Statute236 is the most important piece of legislation regarding labour law 
in Italy. It was proposed and then implemented, on 20 May 1970, by centre-left parties, such as the 
Democrazia Cristiana237 (DC), the Partito Socialista Italiano238 (PSI), the Partito Repubblicano 
Italiano239 (PRI), and the Partito Liberale Italiano240 (PLI). The law consists of forty-one articles 
which apply to work units in the industrial and commercial sectors with more than fifteen employees 
and to agricultural enterprises with more than five employees. These articles are arranged in six parts: 
freedom and dignity of workers (art. 1-13), freedom of association (art. 14-18), trade union activities 
(art. 19-27), various and general provisions (art. 28-32), placement (art. 33-34), final and penal 
provisions (art. 35-41). 
The Workers’ Statute forbids the abuse of disciplinary power (art. 7), investigations into 
employees’ personal opinions (art. 8) and discriminatory behaviour on the grounds of union 
membership (art. 15). In addition, the Workers’ Statute establishes the mechanism for reinstatement 
after invalid dismissals (art. 18), as well as the judicial procedure dealing with the repression of 
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employers’ anti-union behaviour (art. 28). These provisions, therefore, shape the relationship between 
workers and firms, guaranteeing to the former dignity and freedom. 
The Workers’ Statute was the result of a long-standing legal and political process that started 
in the aftermath of the approval of the Constitution of Italian Republic in 1947. A member of the 
Constituent Assembly and Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro241 (CGIL) leader, Giuseppe 
Di Vittorio, presented the proposal ‘Lo Statuto dei diritti dei cittadini lavoratori’ (n. 43/1952)242 
during the CGIL assembly in Napoli. Di Vittorio pointed out that provisions of the Italian Constitution 
– the right to have equal social dignity (art. 3), the right to form association freely (art. 18), the right 
to freely express thoughts in speech, writing, or any other form of communication (art. 21), among 
many others – had never been applied within factories. Therefore, he argued, it was necessary to 
‘bring the Constitution within factories’.243 As he put it: 
 
la Costituzione della Repubblica, la quale garantisce a tutti i cittadini, 
lavoratori compresi, una serie di diritti che nessun padrone ha il potere di 
sopprimere o di sospendere, nei confronti di lavoratori. Non c’è e non ci può 
essere nessuna legge la quale stabilisca che i diritti democratici garantiti dalla 
Costituzione siano validi per i lavoratori soltanto fuori dall’azienda. È vero 
che le fabbriche sono di proprietà privata, ma non per questo i lavoratori 
divengono anch’essi proprietà privata dell’azienda. Il lavoratore, anche sul 
luogo del lavoro, non diventa una cosa, una macchina acquistata o affittata 
dal padrone, e di cui questo possa disporre a suo piacimento. […] Anche sul 
luogo del lavoro, l’operaio conserva intatta la sua dignità umana, con tutti i 
diritti acquisiti dai cittadini della Repubblica Italiana. […] Naturalmente, le 
minacce e gli abusi di cui sono vittime quotidianamente numerosi lavoratori, 
danno spesso luogo a proteste collettive, ad agitazioni, a scioperi. Se si 
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continuasse ad andare avanti nel senso deplorato, queste agitazione sarebbero 
destinate a moltiplicarsi e a generalizzarsi […].244  
 
[The Constitution of the Republic, which guarantees to all people, including 
workers, a set of rights that no boss has the right to abolish or suspend, 
towards workers. There is no law, nor can there be any law, which establishes 
the guarantee of democratic rights of the Constitution only outside factories. 
It is true that factories are private, but that does not mean that workers are 
private, too. A Worker, also within factories, it is not a commodity, a 
machinery bought or rented by the boss, of which can be disposed of at will 
[…]. Even within factories, a worker maintains his human dignity, along with 
all the rights guaranteed by the Italian Republic. […] Naturally, daily threats 
and abuses towards workers, often lead to collective protests, strikes, and 
unrest. Keeping this behavior would multiply and spread such civil unrest 
[…]. 
    
As foreseen by Di Vittorio, during 50s and 60s worker movements and trade confederations 
organised many strikes and demonstrations in favour of the adoption of normative rules regarding 
working conditions, such as the right to form association freely, and the right to freely express 
thoughts and opinions. In 1969, the dissatisfaction spread from the north to the south of the country, 
involving the biggest, most prolonged strike wave in history (known as ‘hot autumn’). During this 
period, workers occupied the main Italian companies, such as Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino 
(FIAT), Pirelli, and Marzotto among many others. 
Owing to this social unrest, the then socialist Labour Minister, Giacomo Brodolini, on the 5-
6 March 1969 appointed a commission, chaired by the socialist and jurist, Gino Giugni, aiming to 
adopt a brand-new labour legislation. The commission – tracing Di Vittorio’s proposal n. 43/1952 – 
drew up a report defining the profile of what would have been the future Workers Statute. On the 20 
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June, Brodolini proposed the bill to the Italian Parliament. After the parliamentary debate, in May 
1970, the two chambers approved the Law 300/1970, due to the vote of the centre-left coalition.245  
The following section highlights how the European Union – through its economic governance 
framework – has committed Renzi Cabinet to further soften specific provisions of the Workers’ 
Statute. 
 
2. 4. Making a Favourable Business Climate in Italy – Part I. The European Union 
and the Italian Labour Market Reform 
Since the establishment of its current system of governance – stemming from the combination 
of the 2011 Stability and Growth Pact, the 2013 Fiscal Stability Treaty and the two-pack – that the 
European Union has been raised further concerns over the adequacy of the Italian labour market to 
tackle the unemployment rate during the ongoing financial and economic crisis. Specifically, the EU 
has held responsible dismissal protections – established by the 1970 Workers’ Statute – to effectively 
tackle unemployment and, as a consequence, to restore economic growth. What I argue here, thus, is 
that the European Union has fostered to further liberalise the Italian labour market, very much in line 
– as I suggest below – with the kinds of measures predicted by the framework of Gill’s new 
constitutionalism. In order to support this argument, I will draw from the Annual Growth Surveys 
(AGSs), Review of progress on policy measures relevant for the correction of Macroeconomic 
Imbalances (RMIs), and other analyses conducted by the European Commission (EC) and the 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) in particular. In addition, I will 
take from National Reform Programme (NRPs) conducted by the then Italian Prime Minister, Matteo 
Renzi, and the then Minister of Economy and Finance, Pier Carlo Padoan. 
As I previously showed (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4), the Annual Growth Survey – setting out 
legal priorities necessary to promote growth and thus capital accumulation – kick-starts the EU’s 
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system of governance. To the purpose of this analysis, I will take into consideration the 2014 AGS246 
which listed five specific priorities to meet during the year. These priorities consisted of: (1) pursuing 
differentiated, growth-friendly fiscal consolidation;247 (2) restoring lending to the economy;248 (3) 
promoting growth and competitiveness;249 (4) tackling unemployment and the social consequences 
of the crisis;250 and (5) modernising public administration. The fourth point – i.e. tackling 
unemployment and the social consequences of the crisis – is particularly relevant for the analysis 
conducted here. 
To be more precise, the EC – in the 2014 Annual Growth Survey – stressed that 
 
Unemployment rates remain historically high, at 11% on average in the EU 
(in July 2013), with a youth unemployment rate of 23.4%. […] The crisis has 
had a particularly negative impact on the most disadvantaged and the share 
of people at risk of poverty has risen to 25% in the EU. This also includes a 
growing risk of structural unemployment and increased exit from the labour 
market, which could have significantly negative effects on EU potential 
growth. […] The immediate priority [thus] should be given to ambitious 
implementation and follow up of reforms regarding the functioning of the 
labour market so that participation can be increased.251 
 
Following the 2014 Annual Growth Survey252, the Italian Government proposed its 2014 NRP 
in which assured the implementation of 
 
fully consistent with the European framework. More specifically, the reforms 
are consistent with the priorities of the 2014 Annual Growth Survey; with the 
recommendations of the European Commission; with the priorities 
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established within the European Semester; and with the seven flagship 
initiatives of the Europe 2020 Strategy. […] In essence, the strength of this 
transformation agenda is found not only in the content of the reforms, but, 
more importantly, in the capacity to translate reforms promptly into 
legislation and implement them rapidly and with certainty. Reforms must be 
planned and carried out effectively, including with the systematic monitoring 
of implementation of ministerial decrees and the subsequent enabling 
legislation.253 
 
Therefore, the Italian Government assured that the implementation of the Jobs Act would have 
produced 
 
a more inclusive and dynamic system to overcome the remaining 
segmentation and rigidity and [it would have contributed] to structurally 
increasing both employment (especially youth employment) and labour 
productivity. Greater flexibility will result from the creation of a single 
contract with forms of progressive protection. Greater protection refers to 
employees, but also includes more broad-based support of private initiatives, 
through special programmes for self-employment, venture capital, and in 
particular youth entrepreneurship. Decentralised contract bargaining will be 
strengthened, further empowering the individual parties to the contract, to 
ensure worker involvement in companies and link compensation to the 
common goal of productivity.254 
 
The European Commission has monitored Italy’s progress on the institutional reform even in 
the midst of the law-making process very closely. In its 2014 Review of progress on policy measures 
relevant for the correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances255, the EC stressed that 
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the Parliament is now discussing an enabling law ('Jobs Act') which would 
allow the government to take action by decree within 6 months after 
parliamentary adoption (foreseen for end-2014) on a wide range of fronts […] 
The direction of the reform is broadly consistent with that of the 2012 reform, 
in particular as it also aims to address labour market segmentation, increase 
exit flexibility (at least for workers with lower seniority) and move further 
towards an integrated social safety net, with a strong emphasis on governance 
reforms and administrative simplification. The potential gains in the area of 
active and passive labour market policies seem particularly promising, but the 
improved functioning of the public employment services is a long-awaited 
precondition. The proposed new permanent contract for new entrants with 
progressive entitlements could improve labour market prospects for young 
people. A contentious issue is the extent to which it should entail reduced 
room for reinstatement in case of dismissals judged unfair.256 
 
In conclusion, the EC gave favourable response to proposed actions, if adopted without major 
changes, since they appear 
 
adequate to address Italy's labour market challenges, notably with regard to 
facilitating the reallocation of labour towards growing sectors and firms, 
reducing segmentation and fostering labour market participation, particularly 
of women. The effectiveness of the reform will depend much on the design 
of the constituent measures and their subsequent implementation on the 
ground.257 
 
If we examine the relationship between EU and Renzi Cabinet from a ‘new constitutionalism’ 
perspective certain over very important implications come into view. More specifically, the EU seems 
to possess – as Sassen has put it – the ‘norm-making capacities’ to set criteria concerning fiscal and 
monetarist policies (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4), as well as other form of legal reforms, such as the 
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labour market reform (see Chapter 2) and institutional reform.258 To put it differently, as Brenner, 
Peck, and Theodore have put it, this framework reflects a ‘U-turn’ in the relationship between 
supranational institutions and nation-states, shifting the relationship itself from a bottom-up to a top-
down model.259 
 In the following section, I try to show that not only the Jobs Act – proposed by then Italian 
Prime Minister, Renzi, and the then Minister of Labour, Giuliano Poletti – dovetailed the EC’s 
recommendation, but also its contents reflect a neoliberal logic of the labour market. 
 
2. 5. The Jobs Act. The Completion of the Neoliberal Restructuring of the Labour 
Market in Italy  
Following the strict dialogue between the European Union and the Italian Cabinet, on 3 April 
2014, the then Italian Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, and the Minister of Labour, Giuliano Poletti, 
proposed the Jobs Act.260 The bill traced the main legal changes envisaged by the European 
Commission both in the 2014 Annual Growth Survey and the 2014 Review of progress on policy 
measures relevant for the correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances, e.g. softening of hiring and 
dismissal regulations. On 3 December 2014, the Italian Parliament voted and approved the Jobs 
Act.261 The labour market reform consisted of a set of provisions that reformed the regulation of 
‘open-ended’ and temporary contracts, seeking a twofold aim: to boost employment (in particular for 
women and young people) and to reduce the use of temporary and atypical type contracts.262 
With regards to the ‘open-ended’ contract type, the Jobs Act introduced a brand-new contract 
type for new hires – i.e. contratto a tutele crescenti (contract with gradually increasing protection) – 
replacing the standard ‘open-ended’ contract established by the Law 300/1970. In particular, the 
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‘contract with gradually increasing protection’ does not provide any obligations for firms to reinstate 
workers after invalid dismissals, unless the latter are discriminatory or orally communicated. On the 
contrary, the brand-new contract type obliges firms to simply reimburse workers with a minimum 
economic compensation, which is an amount equal to two wages per each year of work tenure and 
not less than four wages. In addition, in the case of small firms – i.e. less than 15 employees – the 
compensation is reduced by fifty per cent.263 
With regards to the temporary and atypical contracts, the Jobs Act abrogated workers right to 
get a permanent contract if firms exceed the limit of temporary contracts, which previously consisted 
of 20% of the permanent ones. What is more, the ‘Jobs Act’ extended the use of vouchers. The 
vouchers are non-standard type of employment relationships. In particular, they are hourly tickets 
used to compensate workers, which the net hourly salary amounts to 7.5 euros.264 The Law Jobs Act 
increased the maximum amount of revenues that workers could receive in vouchers from 5.000 to 
7.000 euros. Furthermore, workers under this job relationship do not have any social security right, 
such as paid sick days, maternity leave, or annual leave.265 
It is worth mentioning that the Italian Parliament also introduced – under the 2015 Annual 
Financial Statement266 – a significant monetary incentive for firms hiring workers under the ‘contract 
with gradually increasing protection’. Each firm, thus, hiring a worker under the above-mentioned 
‘open-ended’ contract, as well as all transformations from a temporary to an ‘open-ended’ contract is 
excluded from paying contributions to social security up to 8.060 per year for three years. In doing 
so, the Italian government aimed to speed up a quick diffusion of the brand-new contract type.267 
Very much in line with the kinds of measures predicted by the framework of Gill’s ‘new 
constitutionalism’, the Jobs Act seeks to liberalise the labour market by rewriting specific contents 
of the Workers’ Statute. Specifically, the Jobs Act reflects a further liberalisation of the labour market 
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as understood in many studies associated with the neoliberal ideology. As it was argued before (see 
Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1), the economists Tito Boeri and Pietro Garibaldi argue that dismissal 
protections prevent an efficient shift of human resources from less productive to more productive 
sectors.268 In the second place, as notes the economist Edward Lazear, large unemployment benefits 
would reduce the employment rate, since social benefits would disincentive workers to find another 
job.269 Finally, as argued by Stefano Scarpetta and Thierry Tressel, high costs of dismissal affect 
firms’ willingness to adopt and implement new technologies.270  
The following section highlights economic and social outcomes of the Jobs Act in Italy. In 
particular, drawing on empirical investigations, it attempts to show that the implementation of the 
Jobs Act – consistently with the implications of the ‘new constitutionalism’ framework –has severely 
worsened economic and social conditions of workers in Italy. 
 
2. 6. Economic and Social Outcomes in Italy after the Labour Market Reform 
As argued in the previous section, the Jobs Act was directed towards a twofold aim: to boost 
employment (especially among women, and young people), as well as to reduce the use of temporary 
and atypical contracts (inter alia, contracts that include voucher-paid payment scheme). Up to now, 
several studies271 have evaluated the impact of the labour market reform in Italy. Marta Fana, Dario 
Guarascio, and Valeria Cirillo, in particular, conducted a very interesting empirical investigation on 
the impact of the Jobs Act. To this purpose, they gathered both statistical and administrative data in 
2015 on the flow of labour force, as well as on the flow of different type of contracts. The main data 
sources for their analysis were the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT), the Istituto Nazionale 
della Previdenza Sociale (INPS), and the Directorate-General of the European Commission 
(Eurostat). 
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With regards to the flow of labour force, Fana, Guarascio, and Cirillo noted that the Jobs Act 
is failing in stimulating occupations.272 In particular, data showed a notable transition from 
unemployment to inactivity (35.7%), while the transition from unemployment to employment (16%) 
is lower than the European average (18.6%).273 Going into a more detailed analysis, ISTAT data 
showed that the employment rate in the cohort 15-64 years old is 56,3%, deeply lower the EU average 
(65.6%).274 During 2016, the employment rate raised to 57,3% in Q3, mainly because of the rise of 
temporary and atypical contracts.275  
With regards to the flow of different type of contracts, Fana, Guarascio, and Cirillo noted that 
- in spite of Italian Government’s willingness to reduce the use of temporary and atypical contracts – 
since the implementation of the Jobs Act temporary and atypical relationships between workers and 
employers have quickly raised. In particular, data showed that ‘63% of new workers […] in the first 
nine months of 2015 have a temporary contract’.276 Hourly tickets have had a notable impact on the 
flow of temporary contracts. Data, indeed, showed that – the expansion of the use of vouchers under 
the Law 183/2014 – ‘during the first nine months more than 81 millions of ‘jobs ticket’ have already 
been sold, at an annual rate equal to 70%’.277 This trend has been confirmed even throughout the 
2016, during which more than 109.500.000 millions of hourly tickets have been sold, 34.6% more 
than 2015.278 
As a result, what has emerged is a general worsening economic conditions of Italian workers. 
As a report conducted by the ISTAT showed, during 2015 1.582.000 people lived in abject poverty, 
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while 2.678.000 (10.4%) lived in a state of ‘relative poverty’.279 The economic conditions of Italian 
workers have been even more dramatic during 2016. Data showed, indeed, that the rate of people 
who risk social exclusion or to live in a state of ‘relative poverty’ raised from 28.7% to 30%.280 
These statistical and administrative data seem to confirm the thesis that there is not always a 
positive impact of liberalization of labour market and levels of employment. For instance, a 
significant analysis and discussion on this argument is presented by Dean Baker, Andrew Glyn, David 
Howell, and John Schmitt. They thus support the general idea that there is not any evident link 
between the pattern of deregulation – implemented in the 1990s – and trends in unemployment 
rates.281 In addition to this, they suggest that there is not any evidence of correlation between labour 
market institutions and rates of unemployment.282 Along the same line, Klaus Armingeon and Lucio 
Baccaro do not find in their data and administrative analysis any relationship between employment 
protections and levels of unemployment.283  
The liberalisation of the Italian labour market, thus, not only failed in achieving its main goals, 
but also increased the number of precarious and insecure workers employed on an as-needed basis, 
without any social security right, as well as low, irregular and insecure pay. This argument seems to 
confirm Jamie Peck’s and Nik Theodore’s claim that neoliberal national labour market restructuring 
has led to the rise of a specific type of workers, i.e. contingent workers. As they have put it – especially 
since the 2008 global crisis of the neoliberal form of capitalism – contingent workers represent ‘an 
extreme form of the type of flexible employment arrangements that increasingly are favoured by 
employers’.284 These arrangements have been central to reduce ‘labor costs, to evade legal liabilities 
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[…] associated with employing “regular” workers, and to undermine the foundations of collective 
action in the workplace’.285 
The following section argues that the neoliberal restructuring of the labour market and its 
social and economic consequences have provoked contestation among Italian workers and trade 
confederations. 
 
2. 7. Popular Contestation Against a Neoliberal Restructuring of the Labour 
Market 
As argued in the previous section, several empirical investigations have evaluated the impact 
of the Law 183/2014 upon the Italian labour market. In particular, the analysis conducted by Fana, 
Guarascio and Cirillo have showed that the Jobs Act failed in achieving its main goal, that is to say 
the boost of employment and the reduction of the use of temporary and atypical contracts. On the 
contrary, these investigations have stressed the emergence of an increasing number of contingent 
workers (i.e. employed on an as-needed basis, without any social security right, and low, irregular 
and insecure pay), which represent an extreme form of flexible employment arrangements. 
The Jobs Act, and its neoliberal implications, were resisted by the main Italian trade union, 
that is to say the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL). More specifically, the CGIL 
primarily sought to improve conditions of contingent workers seeking legal remedies to the increasing 
flexibility, shortage of social security rights, and wage theft, stemming from the Law 183/2014. Not 
long after the adoption of the labour market reform, thus, the CGIL collected 3.3 millions of 
signatures of Italian voters to officially propose to the Supreme Court of Cassation286 two abrogative 
referendum questions.287 These questions aimed to eliminate two specific provisions of the Jobs Act, 
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respectively: the brand-new contract type (i.e. contract with gradually increasing protection) and 
hourly tickets (i.e. contracts that include voucher-paid payment scheme).288 
The Supreme Court of Cassation, however, ruled the first of the two questions inadmissible. 
According to the judges, in case of positive response to the abrogative referendum question, the result 
would not have simply re-instated the standard ‘open-ended’ contract established by the Workers’ 
Statute, but would have extended the application of the Workers’ Statute also to work units in the 
industrial and commercial sectors with less than fifteen employees. This judicial interpretation, they 
decided, would have violated Article 75 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic, which simply 
establishes ‘to repeal, in whole or in part, a law or a measure having the force of law’. 
By contrast, in the same ruling289, the court declared the question concerning hourly tickets 
admissible. The judges argued that the Law 183/2014 establishes the use of vouchers not only for 
occasional ‘accessory jobs’, but also for stable and long working relationship between workers and 
employers. For this reason, the Law 183/2014 violates the Law 276/2003290, art. 70, which allows the 
use of hourly tickets only for those workers that risk social exclusion, or for those that are not part of 
the labour market system. 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation to hold the popular consultation over the 
elimination of the hourly tickets had an impact on the political agenda of the Italian Government. The 
Italian Prime Minister, Paolo Gentiloni, eliminated the contracts that include voucher-paid payment 
scheme via Decree Law 25/2017, on 18 March 2017.291 According to the Italian newspaper Il Fatto 
Quotidiano, Gentiloni had confidentially admitted that his decision was motivated by the desire to 
avoid another popular referendum over a highly divisive social issue.292 According to the CGIL 
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leader, Susanna Camusso, the backing away of the government was ‘an amazing result’ made possible 
by millions of workers that wanted to bring dignity and freedom back within work places.293 
 
2. 8. Conclusion 
The present chapter was designed to critically analyse the Jobs Act and its implications from 
Gill’s ‘new constitutionalism’ perspective. In the first place, I attempted to show how the European 
Union – through its system of governance – has committed Renzi Cabinet to reform the labour market 
in Italy. More specifically, the EU has conducted several reports and analyses in which they have 
increasingly considered hiring and dismissal protections – stemming from the Workers’ Statute – as 
obstacles that have hampered employment and thus economic growth in Italy. In the second place, I 
tried to emphasise that the Jobs Act reflects a neoliberal restructuring of the labour market. Indeed, it 
has involved an extreme form of liberalisation of the labour market which not only has created a new 
category of workers – i.e. contingent workers – but also it has provoked the erosion of economic and 
social conditions of workers.   
To conclude, in line with the ‘new constitutionalism’ framework, the Jobs Act has sought to 
erode (partially failing) one of the main legal sources – i.e. Workers’ Statute – which has been the 
political and legal result of social democratic forces in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
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3. New Constitutionalism and the Italian Constitutional Reform. A 
Neoliberal Re-Organising Logic 
 
3. 1. Introduction 
On 4 December 2016, almost sixty percent of the Italian voters reject a constitutional bill that 
had been proposed by the then President of the Council of Ministers, Matteo Renzi, and the then 
Minister of Constitutional Reforms and Relationship with the Parliament, Maria Elena Boschi. The 
bill, if it had been approved, would have brought about the abolition of the symmetric bicameralism, 
as well as the reform of Title V of the Constitution.294 Because of this, they argued, the bill would 
have restarted the process of capital accumulation by making a favourable business climate for 
investors. Although the highly divisive political and academic debate, the constitutional bill has not 
been explored adopting a more critical perspective. For this reason, in this chapter, I will analyse the 
constitutional bill using Gill’s ‘new constitutionalism’ framework. I thus argue that the European 
Union has committed Renzi Cabinet to propose and implement (failing) a neoliberal re-organising 
logic of the national institutional framework, which imply the redistribution of internal powers from 
the legislative to the executive branch.       
In order to support this argument, the first section describes the main principles and contents 
of the Constitution of the Italian Republic. In particular, it highlights its antiauthoritarian and 
democratic spirit, coming from the backlash against the Fascist dictatorship led by Benito Mussolini 
of 1922-1943. The second section highlights how the EU – through its system of governance – has 
committed the Italian Government to revise its institutional framework, in order to face and restore 
the 2007 crisis of capital accumulation. The third section describes the main contents and provisions 
                                               
294 In addition, the constitutional bill included the abolishment of the Consiglio Nazionale dell’Economia e del Lavoro 
(CNEL). The CNEL has been set by art. 99 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic and established in 1957. The CNEL 
is an assembly made up by 65 experts and representatives of economic categories which propose recommendations to the 
Italian Cabinet, the Parliament, and local authorities (e.g. Regions) on economic and social affairs. The President of the 
CNEL is nominated by the President of the Italian Republic, and its members are elected for five years. 
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of the constitutional bill, as well as how those contents and provisions reflect a neoliberal re-
organising logic of the Italian institutional framework. Finally, the fourth section shows the link 
between the neoliberal implications of the reform of the institutional framework and the constitutional 
referendum. 
With this chapter, I thus seek to complete the critical legal analysis of the reform process put 
– during the 2007 Eurozone crisis – in the European Union and in Italy in particular. 
 
3. 2. The 1947 Constitution of the Italian Republic. A Set of Democratic and 
Socialist Founding Principles  
Any critical legal analysis of the contents of the recent constitutional bill should be preceded 
by a retracing of the historical background, in order to understand both social and political reasons 
that led the founding fathers of the 1947 Constitution of the Italian Republic to conceive the current 
national institutional framework. The Constitution of the Italian Republic (Costituzione della 
Repubblica Italiana) was approved by the Constituent Assembly of the Italian Republic295 
(Assemblea Costituente della Repubblica Italiana) on 22 December 1947. Promulgated by the 
Provisional Head of State Enrico De Nicola and published in the extraordinary edition of Italian 
Official Journal (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana) no. 298 on 27 December, the 
constitution came into force on the 1 January 1948.296 Due to the historical context, its contents and 
                                               
295 The Constituent Assembly of the Italian Republic was a parliamentary chamber between 1946-1948. It had the task to 
write the Constitution of the Italian Republic after Mussolini Dictatorship and the Second World War. Its president was 
Giuseppe Saragat (also fifth President of the Italian Republic) and its vice-president was Umberto Terracini (member of 
the Communist Party). Its main deputies, inter alias, were Piero Calamandrei, Palmiro Togliatti (secretary of the 
Communist Party), Leonide Iotti (member of the Communist Party and first female President of the Chamber of Deputies), 
Giovanni Gronchi (third President of the Italian Republic), Oscar Luigi Scalfaro (ninth President of the Italian Republic), 
Alcide De Gasperi (Italian Prime Minister and secretary of the Christian Democracy Party), Luigi Einaudi (second 
President of the Italian Republic), Pertini Sandro (seventh President of the Italian Republic). 
296 The 1947 Constitution of the Italian Republic consists of 139 articles and 18 transitional and final provisions arranged 
in three main parts: Fundamental Principles, part one concerning Rights and Duties of Citizens and part two on the 
Organisation of Republic. The Fundamental Principles recognise the dignity of both individuals and social groups, 
expressing the notions of solidarity and equality without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, and 
social conditions. Finally, the Fundamental Principles not only recognise a central government and the territorial integrity 
of the State, but also promote local authorities. Part one – Rights and Duties of Citizens – establishes civil relations, 
ethical, as well as social, economic and political rights. In conclusion, Part Two – Organisation of Republic – establishes 
the institutional framework. 
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structure are profoundly influenced by the desire of the new republic to break with the norms of the 
Mussolini dictatorship and the Second World War. This influence was strongly remarked by the 
soldier, jurist and politician, Piero Calamandrei, during a set of conferences held in 1955 in Milan. In 
particular, he said the following: 
 
Quanto sangue, quanto dolore per arrivare a questa Costituzione! Dietro ad 
ogni articolo di questa Costituzione, o giovani, voi dovete vedere giovani 
come voi caduti combattendo, fucilati, impiccati, torturati, morti di fame nei 
campi di concentramento, morti in Russia, morti in Africa, morti per le strade 
di Milano, per le strade di Firenze, che hanno dato la vita perché la libertà e 
la giustizia potessero essere scritte su questa carta. Quindi, quando vi ho detto 
che questa carta è morta, no, non è una carta morta, questo è un testamento, 
un testamento di centomila morti. Se voi volete andare in pellegrinaggio nei 
luoghi dove è nata la nostra Costituzione, andate nelle montagne dove 
caddero i partigiani, nelle carceri dove furono imprigionati, nei campi dove 
furono impiccati. Dovunque è morto un italiano per riscattare la libertà e la 
dignità, andate lì, o giovani, con il pensiero, perché è lì che è nata la nostra 
Costituzione.297 
 
[How much blood, how much pain to get this Constitution! Behind each 
article of this Constitution, young people, you must see young people like you 
that died fighting, executed, hanged, tortured, starved to death in 
concentration camps, dead in Russia, dead in Africa, dead over the streets of 
Milano, over the streets of Firenze, that gave their lives in order that freedom 
and justice could be written in this charter. So, when I told you that this 
charter is dead, no, it is not a dead charter, this is a will, one hundred thousand 
dead people’s willingness. If you want to go to a pilgrimage to the place our 
Constitution was created, go to the mountains where partisans fell, to the 
prisons where they were incarcerated, to the field where they were hanged. 
Wherever an Italian died to redeem freedom and dignity, go there, young 
people, with your thought, because that was where our Constitution was 
born.] 
                                               
297 Piero Calamandrei, ‘Difendere la Costituzione Ieri e Oggi, Italia Resistenza’ (1955) <http://www.italia-
resistenza.it/rete/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/26.1.2016-LIBRETTO-Calamandrei-def-1.pdf> accessed 2 October 2017.    
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The dialectical influence of the fascist regime over the Constitution of the Italian Republic is 
evident not only in its founding fathers’ words but also in the rights and structure which the 
constitution establishes.298 With respect to rights, the founding fathers established the above-
mentioned Fundamental Principles, which are characterised by strong antiauthoritarian and 
democratic elements. It is worth mentioning, for instance, Article One which establishes that Italy is 
a democratic Republic, in which the sovereignty belongs to the people and it's exercised by them in 
the forms and within the limits of the Constitution. Article Two recognises the dignity of both 
individuals and social groups and express the notions of solidarity and equality without distinction of 
sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and social conditions. Article Three 
establishes that it is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles that might prevent the effective 
participation of all workers in the political, economic and social organisation of the country.  
With respect to the structure, the framers decided to give a leading role to the parliament to 
the detriment of the government, after the relegation to the powerless position it has experienced 
under Mussolini’s dictatorship.299 As a result, they established two chambers (art. 55) – the Chamber 
of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati) and the Senate of the Republic (Senato della Repubblica) – with 
the same duties and powers. In legal terms, this means that both chambers must approve identical 
bills in order for these to become law300 (art. 70). 
The founding fathers, further, not only assigned to the parliament a central role in the frame 
of the government, but also for the definition of the relationship between the State and Regions, i.e. 
Title V of the Constitution. In particular, this set of provisions appointed local institutions with several 
legislative and administrative powers (art. 117). According to many scholars, this reflects – again – 
the framers’ choice to mark an ideological and institutional distance from the fascist regime, that had 
                                               
298 See: Norberto Bobbio and Franco Pierandrei, Introduzione alla Costitutzione Italiana. Testo di Educazione Civica per 
le Scuole Medie Superiori (Editori Laterza 1975). 
299 Graziella Romeo, ‘The Italian Constitutional Reform of 2016: An ‘Exercise’ of Change at the Crossroad Between 
Constitutional Maintenance and Innovation’ (2017) Special Issue, The Italian Law Journal, 36 
<http://theitalianlawjournal.it/data/uploads/pdf/1-2017/romeo.pdf> accessed 11 October 2017. 
300 ibid.  
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been characterised by strong centralisation of both legislative and administrative procedures upon the 
Government and the Parliament. 
Furthermore, the Constitution of the Italian Republic reflects its antiauthoritarian and 
antifascist spirit with respect to art. 138 and 139, which make the process of constitutional reform 
very long and detailed. The former sets the constitutional procedure to modify the constitution. In 
particular, it requires two readings of the bill and an absolute majority of the members of the Chamber 
of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic. However, if one-fifth of the members of a chamber or 
five hundred thousand voters or five Regional Councils request a popular referendum, the bill needs 
the positive response of the Italian people for its final approval. The latter, however, states that the 
form of the Republic shall not be a matter for constitutional amendment. 
The following section highlights the national and international debate on the Italian 
institutional framework. In particular, it focuses on what many legal scholars and political scientists 
consider the inherent weaknesses of this institutional framework, namely the relationship between 
the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic, as well as the relationship between central 
state and local authorities. Finally, it analyses the impact of the institutional framework on the 
national economic system. 
 
3. 3. Making of a Favourable Business Climate in Italy – Part II. The European 
Union and the Italian Institutional Framework  
As described in the previous section, the 1947 Constitution of the Italian Republic assigned 
to the Parliament a central role in the frame of the Government, as well as the shift of specific 
legislative and administrative powers from central state towards local authorities. After the 2007 crisis 
of capital accumulation hit, however, concerns began to be raised about the adequacy of the Italian 
institutional framework in responding effectively and quickly to the crisis. To date, a small number 
of scholars have argued a cause-and-effect relationship between the financial and economic crisis and 
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the Italian institutional reform process.301 For instance, a significant analysis and discussion on this 
argument is presented by the political scientist, Silvia Bolgherini. She thus considers the 2007 
financial and economic crisis as the turning point for the recent bid to speed up the reform of Italy’s 
institutional structures.302 More specifically – drawing from study conducted by John Alan 
Robinson303 – Bolgherini argues that economic crises often have an impact on institutional structures, 
and that the more hard-bitten the crisis, the deeper is the impact.304 These reforms – or in Bolgherini’s 
view ‘crisis-driven reforms’305 – are meant to respond rapidly and effectively to the crisis.306 
Bolgherini’s study, however, does not demonstrate this trend empirically. In this chapter, 
however, I will seek to go a step further arguing that the European Union – through its system of 
governance – has directly committed Renzi Cabinet to revise the Italian institutional framework in 
order to reduce the ‘red tape’, and thus to create a favourable business climate for investors. For this 
reason, I will argue that – in line with Gill’s ‘new constitutionalism’ framework – the whole Italian 
institutional reform process reflects a neoliberal re-organising logic. In order to support this argument, 
I will draw from the Annual Growth Surveys (AGSs), Review of progress on policy measures relevant 
for the correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances (RMIs), and other analyses conducted by the 
European Commission (EC) and the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG 
ECFIN) in particular. In addition, I will take from National Reform Programme (NRPs) conducted 
                                               
301 See: Sergio Fabbrini, ‘Intergovernmentalism and Its Limits Assessing the European Union’s Answer to the Euro 




24&EXT=pdf> accessed 16 October 2017; Silvia Bogherini, ‘Crisis-driven Reforms and Local Discretion: an Assessment 
of Italy and Spain’ (2016) 46/1 Italian Political Science Review <https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-
cambridge-
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302 Bogherini (n 298) 73. 
303 John Alan Robinson, ‘Crisis’ in David L. Sills and Robert K. Merton (Ed), International Encyclopedia of Social 
Sciences, New York (Macmillan 1968) 510-514. 
304 Bogherini (n 301) 73. 
305 ibid 74. 
306 ibid 73-77. 
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by the then Italian Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, and the then Minister of Economy and Finance, 
Pier Carlo Padoan.  
As I previously showed (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4; or Chapter 2, Section 2.4), the Annual 
Growth Survey – setting out legal priorities necessary to promote growth and thus capital 
accumulation – kick-starts the EU’s system of governance. To the purpose of the analysis conducted 
here, I will take into consideration the 2014 AGS307 which listed five specific priorities to meet during 
the year. These priorities consisted of: (1) pursuing differentiated, growth-friendly fiscal 
consolidation;308 (2) restoring lending to the economy;309 (3) promoting growth and 
competitiveness;310 (4) tackling unemployment and the social consequences of the crisis;311 and (5) 
modernising public administration.312 The last point – i.e. modernising public administration – is 
pivotal for our analysis. Specifically, the EC stressed the necessity to ‘modernise’ EU member-states’ 
public administrations, by clarifying the competences at all levels of government. Because of this, 
the EC further highlighted, EU member-states would have been able to simplify the business 
environment, reduce the red tape313, and improve the quality of legislation.314 Following the 2014 
Annual Growth Survey, the Italian Government proposed its 2014 National Reform Programme315 
which detailed the set of policies that Renzi Cabinet would have implemented to comply with the 
priorities set out by the European Commission. The government thus assured that the adoption and 
the implementation of legal reforms would have been 
 
fully consistent with the European framework. More specifically, the reforms 
are consistent with the priorities of the 2014 Annual Growth Survey; with the 
recommendations of the European Commission; with the priorities 
established within the European Semester; and with the seven flagship 
                                               
307 European Commission (n 246). 
308 ibid 3. 
309 ibid. 
310 ibid. 
311 ibid 4. 
312 ibid 11. 
313 The ‘red tape’ refers to an excessive complexity of official procedures which usually results in delay or inaction. 
314 European Commission (n 246) 13. 
315 Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze (n 252). 
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initiatives of the Europe 2020 Strategy. […] In essence, the strength of this 
transformation agenda is found not only in the content of the reforms, but, 
more importantly, in the capacity to translate reforms promptly into 
legislation and implement them rapidly and with certainty. Reforms must be 
planned and carried out effectively, including with the systematic monitoring 
of implementation of ministerial decrees and the subsequent enabling 
legislation.316 
 
Owing to this, the government emphasised that  
 
Fiscal and economic measures may yield concrete result only if combined 
with a sound modernisation process of the republican institutions. The 
institutional and constitutional reforms can provide the measures to cut public 
spending and boost competitiveness with the added value necessary to make 
them fully effective. Through institutional reform, citizens will be able to 
appreciate the benefits of more extensive and effective economic measures, 
while the government achieves results in terms of growth, employment and 
welfare.317  
 
The European Commission has also monitored Italy’s progress on the institutional reform 
even in the midst of the law-making process. More specifically – with the 2014 Review of progress 
on policy measures relevant for the correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances318 – the EC specifically 
pointed out Italy’s public administration and governance inefficiency as one of the main factors 
responsible for hampering the quality of business environment. Indeed, the staff stated as following 
  
the effective implementation of policy measures adopted recently and in 
previous years remains the country's Achilles' heel. Important institutional 
challenges still exist at least at three levels. First, law-making processes are 
often lengthy and cumbersome. The fragmentation of measures over different 
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318 Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (n 255). 
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legal instruments leading to piecemeal legislation, the frequent use of speedy 
decree laws favouring a wide range of partial measures over more profound 
structural reforms, and lags in the adoption of required implementing 
legislation tend to create legal uncertainty for all actors involved. Second, in 
the field of implementation, the overlapping of competences between state 
and regions, the lack of coordination in the division of responsibilities 
between central and local public administrations and the continued existence 
of bureaucratic rules and procedures at local level hamper measures from 
reaching their full potential, especially in competition and business 
environment simplification. Sometimes, the lack of adequate capabilities and 
capacity within local public administrations impair the efficient execution of 
public tasks. Third, the actual enforcement of new policy measures is being 
hampered and discouraged by Italy's ineffective judicial system characterised 
by a large backlog of cases and very long duration of court proceedings.319 
 
For these reasons, the European Commission hoped for a smooth and well implemented 
adoption of the constitutional reform. In particular, 
 
In March 2014, the government tabled an ambitious draft constitutional bill 
that intends to accelerate the parliamentary approval of legislation, reduce the 
cost of politics and increase political and regulatory certainty and efficiency 
through a reduction of the size and a reform of the role of the Senate, the 
abolition of provinces as constitutionally recognised authorities and a 
clarified distribution of competences between state and regions (as governed 
by Title V of the Constitution). The draft constitutional bill needs to undergo 
at least four readings with final parliamentary approval envisaged by end-
2015 (mid-2016 if less than two thirds of the Parliament approves the final 
text and therefore a referendum is needed). The Senate completed the first 
reading in August 2014, and the bill is now in the Chamber which is expected 
to vote by end-2014. If not weakened during the parliamentary adoption 
process and well implemented, the constitutional reform could contribute to 
smoother processes of adoption and implementation of reforms.320 
                                               
319 ibid 14-15. 
320 ibid 15-16. 
 78 
 
It seems clear that – in line with Gill’s ‘new constitutionalism’ framework – the European 
Union possesses, in Sassen’s view, the ‘norm-making capacities’ to set criteria concerning fiscal and 
monetarist policies (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4), as well as other form of legal reforms, such as the 
labour market reform (see Chapter 2) and institutional reform.321 To put it differently, this process 
reflects what Brenner, Peck, and Theodore have considered a ‘U-turn’ in the relationship between 
supranational institutions and nation-states, shifting the relationship itself from a bottom-up to a top-
down model.322 
In the following section, I will argue that not only the cause-and-effect relationship between 
the EU and the institutional reform process, but also the contents of the constitutional bill reflect 
Gill’s ‘new constitutionalism’ framework. 
 
3. 4. The Constitutional Reform. A Neoliberal Re-Organising Logic of the Italian 
Institutional Framework  
Following the dialogue between the European Union (and the EC in particular) and the Italian 
Cabinet, the constitutional bill n. 1429 – B323, voted and approved by the Italian Parliament on 12 
April 2016, reflected the contents of both the 2014 Annual Growth Survey and the 2014 Review of 
progress on policy measures relevant for the correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances quite 
precisely. The bill thus called for altering the current relationship between the executive and the 
parliament, as well as the relationship between national and subnational levels. In legal terms, this 
consisted of: (1) the abolishment of symmetric bicameralism; and (2) the revision of Title V of part 
II of the Constitution. The abolishment of symmetric bicameralism324 was the core of the national 
                                               
321 Sassen (n 128) 117. 
322 Brenner et al (n 131) 127-129. 
323 Senato della Repubblica, ‘Disegno di Legge Costituzionale n. 1429 – B’ 
<http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/00906778.pdf> accessed 20 November 2017.  
324 The Italian symmetric bicameralism (also refer to as ‘perfect bicameralism’) is a unique example of legislative process 
in which two chambers – the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic – carry out the same functions. Within 
this context, a legislative act has to be passed in an identical form in both assemblies. 
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institutional framework reform. The bill would have reduced the members of the Senate of the 
Republic from 315 to 100 (made up as following: of 21 mayors, 74 members of regional councils and 
five presidential nominees). With regards to its duties and powers, the Senate of the Republic would 
have been excluded from the vote of confidence (art. 55). The Chamber of Deputies, therefore, would 
have been the only one to control Government’s political accountability (art. 55). With regards to the 
legislative power, the two chambers would have shared the legislative function only concerning laws 
on constitutional issues, the Senate’s electoral system, popular referenda, and local authorities (art. 
70, 71, 72). In all other cases, the only Chamber of Deputies would have exercised the legislative 
power. Further, the bill would have included the right of the Government to meet specific timing and 
deadlines for the final approval of national laws. The Senate of the Republic, from its side, would 
have been allowed only to propose changes, although the Chamber of Deputies ‘would have kept the 
last word’.325 
Apart from this, the framers of the constitutional bill sought not only the abolition the 
symmetric bicameralism, but also to revise Title V of part II of the Constitution. This revision, they 
argued, would have solved a long-standing lack of efficiency and stability of the executive, by 
reorganising the legislative competences between the State (such as the Government and the 
Parliament) and the Regions (including local governments and regional councils). In particular, the 
reform would have brought back to the State some key competences that the 2001 revision of Title V 
of part II moved towards local governments, inter alia labour policies, anti-trust regulation, strategic 
infrastructures and foreign policies. What is more, the executive would have been able to propose 
legislation to the Parliament on matters that originally were not reserved to the State (also referred to 
as ‘supremacy clause’), when required to protect the juridical and economic unity of Italy, or to 
protect national interests. Finally, the revision of Title V of part II of the Constitution would have 
amended the already existing ‘power to replace’ regional and local institutions when their action (or 
inaction) ‘would have violated international (including EU) obligations or compromised public 
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safety, legal and economic unity or the guarantee of essential conditions for the exercise of rights’326, 
or in case of budget imbalances. 
In addition to this, the constitutional bill would have reshaped the system of constitutional 
guarantees (inter alia popular legislative initiative, as well as referendum). In particular, the bill 
would have raised from 50.000 to 150.000 the minimum number of signatures requested for enabling 
such instruments of direct democracy. What is more, if the signatures collected would have been 
500.000, for the validity of the consultation would have been necessary the majority of people entitled 
to vote. By contrast, if the signatures collected would have been 800.000, the consultation would have 
been valid with the majority of voters. 
In order to understand the real essence of the constitutional bill proposed by the Matteo Renzi 
administration between 2014-2016, however, it is necessary to analyse the electoral law n. 52 of 
2015327 (also referred to as ‘Italicum’) proposed by the same government. In particular, the Italicum 
promoted the formation of absolute majorities in national election, by means of an ‘electoral prize’ 
in case a political party (not a coalition) obtained more than 40% of the votes in the first round, or, in 
case of a second ballot, the sheer simple majority of voters. As one might expect, the electoral law 
would have applied only to the Chamber of Deputies. In doing so, as often stated by the then Italian 
Prime Minister328, the combination of the reform of the constitutional law, as well as the electoral law 
would have ensured efficiency and stability to the entire institutional framework and the decision-
making process in particular. 
The institutional reform as whole has provoked, as Giacomo Delledonne and Giuseppe 
Martinico have put it, a very long – more than two years – and highly divisive debate over its 
consequences within the Italian political system.329 Many legal scholars and political scientists 
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Constitutional Reform’ (2016) Special Issue, The Italian Law Journal, 49-51 
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stressed the necessity of such reform to remove the bottleneck of the law-making process. For 
instance, George Tsebelis has suggested that the currently the symmetric bicameralism adds an 
additional veto player, the Senate of the Republic, to the Italian law-making process. Because of this, 
he has further argued, the set of bills that could be useful to  ‘the set of bills that could conceivably 
beat the status quo shrinks, and policy change abates […] and the role of the agenda setter (deployed 
by the government) is reduced under bicameralism’.330 By contrast, he has further argued, the 
abolishment of the symmetric bicameralism would reduce 'the number of institutional veto players in 
the Italian system of governance. As a result, [...] the power of the government will increase (given 
that it controls the agenda, in a system where the number of veto players decreases)'.331 In doing so, 
the Italian institutional framework would improve its institutional capacity to allow more policy 
change, as well as government stability, for the good of economic growth.332;333 
By contrast, many other legal scholars and political scientists have argued that the bill would 
have involved the risk to an authoritarian and anti-democratic drift in Italy, due to the extreme 
centralisation of powers among the government. For instance, Professor Alessandro Pace argued that 
the constitutional bill n. 1429 - B – if read together with the electoral law n. 52/2015 – was an 
‘subversive act’, which privileged the stability and efficiency of the government to the detriment of 
the parliament.334 Along the same lines, Professor Stefano Rodotà highlighted the danger of 
transferring a range of powers from the legislative to the executive branch. In particular, the 
constitutional bill harmed the separation of powers established by the Constitution of the Italian 
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Republic, involving what Rodotà referred to as an ‘oligarchic logic’.335 To put it in other words, the 
bill sought to create a government in which a small group holds the executive power, as well as 
possesses great influence over the parliament.336 Similarly, Professor Gustavo Zagrebelsky expressed 
his concerns over the constitutional reform proposed by Matteo Renzi Government. In particular, he 
expressed his concerns about the constitutional reform, highlighting its negative effects on the legal 
system in Italy. Interestingly, he made a more comprehensive analysis and criticism on the possibility 
to deprive the democratic state of its role, to the extent that the Prime Minister would have been 
considered a political commander-in-chief'.337 
As just described, this second strand of analyses has emphasised the risk to an authoritarian 
and anti-democratic drift in Italy, due to the centralisation of powers among the government to the 
detriment of both the parliament and local institutions. Such studies, however, remain narrow in focus 
dealing only with the national framework. However, if I examine the constitutional bill from a ‘new 
constitutionalism’ perspective very important implications of the reform process come into view.  
Specifically, the ways in which the constitutional bill was justified by the government and others 
reflects, I suggest, what Sassen describes as a neoliberal re-organising logic of nation-states, which 
entail the redistribution of powers from the legislative branch (including, parliaments and courts) to 
the executive one (such as, governments, central banks and ministries of finance).338 Within the 
greater ‘new constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism’ framework, as Sassen has put it (see 
Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1) the executive branch must possess the institutional power to enable within 
national borders new constitutionalist measures – both macroeconomic (such as financial policies) 
and microeconomic (including labour and pension policies) – the content of which are usually 
negotiated with the EC, the ECB, and the IMF. Italy’s constitutional bill seems to confirm this trend 
in that, as I have just described, the bill sought to centralise the power in the hands of the government, 
                                               
335 Stefano Rodotà, Democrazia e Costituzione. Perché Dire No alla Riforma Boschi e Costruire una Politica 
Costituzionale (Castelvecchi 2016) 24-25. 
336 ibid. 
337 Zagrebelsky (n 19) 96-97. 
338 Sassen (n 128) 120-122.  
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in order to ease and speed up the implementation of legal mechanisms coming from the European 
Union. 
The next section will show that the rejection of the constitutional bill should be understood 
not only as the refusal of a specific institutional framework reform, but also as the refusal of a greater 
neoliberal process envisaged by the European Union and Renzi Government between 2014-2016. 
 
3. 5. Popular Contestation Against a New Constitutionalist Reform 
As showed throughout this chapter, the European Union – via its current system of economic 
governance – have fostered a neoliberal re-organising logic of its institutional framework. In the 
aftermath of the approval of the constitutional bill, indeed, one hundred and sixty-six members of the 
Chamber of Deputies, as well as one hundred and three members of the Senate of the Republic (all 
of them part of the opposition bloc, which includes Movimento 5 Stelle, Fratelli d’Italia, Lega Nord, 
and Sinistra Italiana) officially proposed to the Supreme Court of Cassation339 a constitutional 
referendum to approve or reject the contents of the constitutional bill.340 On 6 May 2016, the Supreme 
Court of Cassation declared the deputies’ and senators’ request to set the constitutional referendum 
admissible.341 On 4 December 2016, Italian voters were asked to decide whether accept or reject the 
constitutional bill, and voted to reject it by a majority of 59.11% (19.420.271) to 40.89% (13.431.842) 
approving.  
The electoral data of the 2016 constitutional referendum seems to confirm a cause-and-effect 
relationship between the electoral behaviour of Italian voters and what this thesis understands as a 
neoliberal governance of the ongoing European financial and economic crisis. Data gathered by the 
                                               
339 The Supreme Court of Cassation is at the top of the ordinary jurisdiction. One of its key duty is to ensure certainty in 
the interpretation of the law. It also performs non-judicial functions related to elections, and referendum for the abrogation 
of laws. 
340 ‘Riforme, Raggiunto alla Camera Quorum per Richiesta Referendum’ Corriere della Sera (Milano, 19 aprile 2016) 
<http://www.corriere.it/politica/16_aprile_19/166-voti-camera-referendum-riforme-costituzionali-5e2c8c76-0620-11e6-
98ad-d281ab178a74.shtml> accessed 8 January 2018. 
341 Corte di Cassazione, ‘Ordinanza Ufficio Centrale per il Referendum’ del 6 maggio 2016. 
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Ipsos Group S. A.342, indeed, show that higher had been people’s dissatisfaction of their social and 
economic condition due to the crisis, higher had been their inclination to reject the constitutional bill. 
In particular, the majority of ‘no’ voters were young and low-income people, who had been the 
hardest hit the most by the implementation of neoliberal measures (see Chapter 2, Section 2. 1.) during 
the 2007 Eurozone financial and economic crisis. Specifically, the 64 per cent of people between 18 
and 34 years old, as well as the 78 per cent of unemployed people, voted ‘no’ to the reform bill. By 
contrast, a majority of ‘yes’ voters are elderly and high-income individuals. 49 per cent of people 
over 64 years old, and 41 per cent of businessmen and managers fell into this camp. This interpretation 
is further backed up by the ‘geography of the vote’. The Ipsos Group S. A. further estimates that the 
‘no’ vote was especially strong in the South and the Islands – where the impact of neoliberal measures 
had been more dramatic – with about 70 per cent in Sicilia and Sardegna, and about 65 per cent in 
Calabria and Puglia. By contrast, majority of ‘yes’ vote prevailed in the North, with about 60 per cent 
in Toscana and Trentino Alto-Adige, and about 50 per cent in Piemonte and Lombardia.343 
Further data gathered by the Ipsos Group S. A. suggest that Italian voters had perceived the 
constitutional bill more as a structural reform – fostered by the European Union – rather than a mere 
institutional revision. The study, hence, shows that Italian voters consistently followed the line of the 
country’s eurosceptic parties and political movements, which obtained great successes during the 
2014 European Parliament election. For instance, the 83 per cent of voters of the ‘Lega Nord’ voted 
against the constitutional bill, and only the 10 per cent voted in favour of it. Similarly, the 76 per cent 
of electors of ‘Fratelli d’Italia’ strongly rejected the reform, and only the 9 per cent voted in favour 
of its final approval. Likewise, the 78 per cent of voters of ‘l’Altra Europa con Tsipras’, and the 86 
per cent of electors of the ‘Movimento 5 Stelle’ voted against the constitutional reform.344 
                                               
342 The Ipsos Group S. A. is an Italian research company which conducts marketing research, media and advertising 
research, opinion and social research, and client and employee relationship management. See: Ipsos Group S. A., 
‘Referendum Costituzionale 2016’ Ipsos Public Affair (2016) 




This argument is well exemplified by many Italian scholars, which argue that the rejection of 
the constitutional bill should be understood as a reaction against the neoliberal practices fostered by 
the European Union since the ongoing financial and economic crisis in Europe.345 For example, the 
philosopher Cinzia Arruzza argues that the result of the constitutional referendum was the product of 
the Matteo Renzi government’s attempt to implement neoliberal social and economic legislations, as 
well as to erode the democratic contents of the Constitution of the Italian Republic, by centralising 
the power in the hands of the executive.346 Along the same lines, the political scientist Vittorio Amato 
states that Italian electors rejected not only the constitutional bill, but also a greater ‘intention to 
modernise Italy making it converge with the Anglo-Saxon neoliberal model’.347 
 
3. 6. Conclusion 
The present chapter was designed to analyse the constitutional bill from a ‘new 
constitutionalism’ perspective. Firstly, and similarly to the labour market reform (as I shown in 
Chapter 2) the European Union has committed Renzi Government to modify the Italian institutional 
framework. In particular, I tried to emphasise that the bill did not imply a mere national revision of 
the institutional framework, but a neoliberal re-organising logic which imply a central role of the 
government to the detriment of the parliament.  
To conclude, along the same lines of the labour market reform (as I described in the previous 
chapter), the constitutional bill has sought to erode (unsuccessfully) the main legal sources – i.e. the 
1947 Constitution of the Italian Republic – which has been the political and legal result of social 
democratic forces in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
                                               
345 See for example Cinzia Arruzza, ‘Italy's Refusal’ (2017) 103 New Left Review 
<https://newleftreview.org/II/103/cinzia-arruzza-italy-s-refusal> accessed 22 January 2018; Vittorio Amato, ‘Are 
Globalization and Economic Crisis Fueling Populism? Some Evidence from the Voting Behavior in the Italian 
Constitutional Referendum’ (2017) Filodritto Editore – Proceedings 
<https://www.academia.edu/33664153/Are_Globalization_and_Economic_Crisis_Fueling_Populism_Some_Evidence_
from_the_Voting_Behavior_in_the_Italian_Constitutional_Referendum> accessed 22 January 2018. 
346 Cinzia Arruzza (n 345) 117-118. 
347 Vittorio Amato (n 345) 207. 
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Conclusion 
In the aftermath the outburst of the 2007 financial and economic crisis in Europe, legal 
scholars and political scientists have conducted striking legal studies concerning the major legal 
changes that had been implemented in the European Union (EU), as well as in Italy. Most of these 
studies deal with the implications of the 2011 revision of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the 
2013 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(TSCG), and the two-pack within the European Union. Or they deal with the implications of the Jobs 
Act, and the constitutional bill within the Italian legal system. The strength of these legal studies lies 
in their capacity to well describe the legal changes that had been implemented and their political and 
legal implications. For instance, some of them agree that the European Union's regulations have 
strengthened its own legal capacity to ensure compliance, among its member-states, with financial 
and economic parameters, as well as to address any deviation from such parameters by enabling 
monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms. Similarly, other legal scholars and political scientist agree 
that the Jobs Act made the labour market system more flexible in order to face unemployment and 
thus to restore economic growth. Or that the constitutional bill – if approved – would have made the 
institutional framework more efficient aiming to encourage both international and national investors 
to invest capitals in Italy.   
As I argued in the introductory part of this thesis, however, these studies adopted a 'problem-
solving' perspective. To put it in other words, they dealt with specific regulations accepting the 
existing order within both the EU and Italy. By contrast, this study adopted a rather different 
perspective to critically analyse the reform process put in place within both the European Union and 
Italy in particular. A notable theoretical framework that helped in writing a critical analysis is Gill’s 
‘new constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism’. According to Gill, ‘new constitutionalism’ is 
the politico-legal mechanism associated with neoliberal restructuring of the world order. ‘New 
constitutionalism’ thus operates to create and preserve a neoliberal order which provides favourable 
legal and other protections for investors in order to generate capital accumulation. To this purpose, 
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new constitutionalist measures, he argues, insulate dominant economic forces from democratic 
pressure and popular accountability, as well as institutionalise the liberalisation of markets for capital, 
goods, and labour. The former seeks to make any political contestation against the neoliberal form of 
capitalism hard to achieve. The latter seek to generate economic growth and extend capital 
accumulation.  
Within this theoretical framework, this thesis assumed two different but non-conflicting 
hypotheses. The first hypothesis assumed that the European Union proposed and implemented a 
combination of regulations – such as, the 2011 revision of the Stability and Growth Pact, the 2013 
Fiscal Stability Treaty, and the two-pack – consistent with the new constitutionalist perspective. 
These regulations thus designed to strengthen neoliberal governance in Europe. In the first place, the 
European Union has imposed strict fiscal discipline upon its member-states to address fiscal 
imbalances. In the second place, the European Union possesses a set of monitoring and sanctioning 
instruments which address any deviation from the just mentioned fiscal discipline. Owing to this, the 
European political and economic union has primarily sought to maintain confidence of investors and 
credibility of governments by attempting to provide an appropriate business climate and thus to 
restore the process of capital accumulation. 
In addition, this thesis advanced the hypothesis that not only the above-mentioned regulations, 
but also the Jobs Act, as well as the constitutional bill reflected the new constitutionalist perspective. 
Specifically, the European Union – through its current system of governance – committed Renzi 
Government to propose a neoliberal restructuring of both labour market, and institutional framework 
in Italy. With regards to the labour market reform, I argued that the Jobs Act sketched out a neoliberal 
reform of the Italian labour market. To be more precise, the Jobs Act sought to make the labour 
market more flexible – specifically by removing hiring and dismissal protections – in order to make 
the national labour market more amenable to investors’ needs and, as a consequence, to boost the 
economic growth. I also suggest that the Jobs Act has involved the emergence of a specific workers’ 
category, that is to say contingent workers. With regards to the institutional reform, the research 
assumed that the constitutional bill – if had been approved – would have involved a neoliberal re-
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organising logic of the Italian institutional framework. The bill thus would have strengthened the 
executive branch of government to the detriment of the legislative branch in order to free the Italian 
Government to smoothly implement European Union’s legal reforms within its national legislation. 
In order to support this argument and thus address the two different but non-conflicting 
hypotheses, this thesis was divided into three chapters. The first chapter – Between Neoliberalism, 
New Constitutionalism, and the European Union – I tried to demonstrate that the 2011 revision of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, the 2013 Fiscal Stability Treaty, and the two-pack sought to deal with 
dislocations and contradictions of the neoliberal form of capitalism. These regulations – based upon 
neoliberal market-monetarist assumptions – impose strict fiscal discipline establishing that national 
budgets of contracting parties should be balanced or in surplus (structural deficit must be more than 
0.5% Gross Domestic Product, which is up to 1% if the debt ratio is below 60% GDP). In case 
contracting parties do not fulfil such obligations, the above-mentioned regulations set both 
monitoring instruments (such as, the Annual Growth Survey, and Review of progress on policy 
measures relevant for the correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances) and sanctioning instruments 
(including, Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, as well as European Stability Mechanism), which 
keep constantly under surveillance and monitoring governments’ policies in order to avoid any 
deviation from the neoliberal discourse. 
Following, this chapter argued that the implications of such regulations are evident – in its 
most dramatic form – in the Greek case. Due to the severe debt crisis that affected Greece, the 
European Union enabled the European Stability Mechanism. This mechanism required the 
implementation of specific legal measures (inter alia, fiscal reforms, and economic reforms) to meet 
both financial and economic parameters set by the above-mentioned regulations, prioritising market 
efficiency over any other instance. The Greek Government, however, broke off the negotiations and 
announced a popular referendum to decide whether Greece was to decide the proposal proposed by 
the above-mentioned supranational organisations. The bailout conditions were rejected by the 61% 
of Greek (39% voted in favour of it). The Greek Prime Minister, however, buckled under the pressure 
made by the creditors and assured to meet the conditions set out in the third economic adjustment 
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programme, making clear the use of the European Stability Mechanism to attenuate, or even suppress, 
any political backlash against the neoliberal ideology.  
Finally, this chapter tried to demonstrate that the implementation of the above-mentioned new 
constitutionalist measures has provoked what Gill and Cutler refer to as a general crisis of legitimacy 
for the European integration project. This idea has been proven by the increasing relevance of old 
and new eurosceptic parties and movements across Europe in the aftermath of the 2007 financial and 
economic crisis (inter alia, the Dansk Folkeparti, the Partij voor de Vrijheid, the Alternative für 
Deutschland, the Freiheitlich Partei Österreichs, the UK Independence Party, the Front National, the 
Lega Nord, the Movimento 5 Stelle, the Syriza, and the Popular Association – Golden Dawn). 
Specifically, the 2014 European Parliamentary election attested the electoral success of eurosceptic 
parties and movements – from the left-right political spectrum – with an overall size of the group 
increased to more than 100 Members of the European Parliament (e.g. European Conservatives and 
Reformists, European United Left/Nordic Green Left, and Europe for Freedom and Direct Democracy 
Group) to the detriment of the main three pro-European Union parties (e.g. Group of the European 
People’s Party, Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European 
Parliament, and Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe). 
In the second chapter and third chapter the thesis, I shifted the focus of the critical analysis to 
the Italian context. To be more precise, I argued that the European Union – through the 2014 Annual 
Growth Survey and the 2014 Review of progress on policy measures relevant for the correction of 
Macroeconomic Imbalances – committed Renzi Government to propose a neoliberal restructuring of 
both labour market, and institutional framework in Italy. Both legal documents included a list of both 
general priorities and specific structural reforms to be put in place in Italy to create a favourable 
business climate for investors and thus restore capital accumulation. This framework proves, as 
argued by Brenner, Peck, and Theodore, the ‘U-turn’ in the relationship between supranational 
institutions and nation-states, shifting the relationship itself from a bottom-up to a top-down model. 
In the second chapter – New Constitutionalism of Disciplinary Neoliberalism and the 
Liberalisation of the Italian Labour Market – I thus argued that the Jobs Act should be understood as 
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commensurate to the new constitutionalist framework. The Jobs Act thus consisted of a set of 
provisions that reformed the regulation of ‘open-ended’ and temporary contracts, seeking a twofold 
aim: to boost of employment and to reduce the use of temporary and atypical type contracts. As I 
described, the ‘contract with gradually increasing protection’ does not provide any obligations for 
firms to reinstate workers after invalid dismissals, unless the latter are discriminatory or orally 
communicated. On the contrary, the brand-new contract type obliges firms to simply reimburse 
workers with a minimum economic compensation. In addition to this, the Jobs Act allowed firms to 
use both temporary and atypical contracts, exceeding the limit of 20% set by previous legislations. 
The temporary and atypical contract type do not provide any social security (such as paid sick days, 
maternity leave, or annual leave) for workers. This argument thus confirmed Gill's statement 
concerning the role of new constitutionalist measures to further extend capital accumulation by the 
liberalisation of labour.  
In addition to this, I also described how the Jobs Act failed in reaching its goals. Many 
quantitative and administrative data, in the first place, showed that the Law 183/2014 failed in 
stimulating occupations. In the second place, data showed that temporary and atypical relationships 
between workers and employers have quickly raised. As a result, what has emerged is a general 
worsening economic conditions of Italian workers. These statistical and administrative data 
confirmed the thesis that there is not always a positive impact of liberalization of labour market and 
levels of employment.  In addition to this, the liberalisation of the Italian labour market, thus, not 
only failed in achieving its main goals, but also increased the number of precarious and insecure 
workers employed on an as-needed basis, without any social security right, as well as low, irregular 
and insecure pay. This argument confirmed Peck’s and Theodore’s claim that neoliberal national 
labour market restructuring has led to the rise of a specific type of workers, i.e. contingent workers. 
Finally, I tried to demonstrate that the erosion of labour security and the worsening of social 
conditions of workers in Italy has provoked a popular backlash against the Jobs Act. This is evident 
in the CGIL’s willingness to officially propose to the Supreme Court of Cassation two abrogative 
referendum questions. In particular, these questions aimed to eliminate two specific provisions of the 
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Jobs Act: the brand-new contract type (i.e. contract with gradually increasing protection) and some 
of atypical contract type (i.e. hourly tickets). The Supreme Court of Cassation, however, rejected one 
of the two abrogative referendum questions. This had an impact on the political agenda of the Italian 
Government. The Italian Prime Minister, Paolo Gentiloni, indeed, agreed over their elimination via 
decree law on 18 March 2017. 
The third and final chapter – New Constitutionalism of Disciplinary Neoliberalism and the 
Neoliberal Re-Organising Logic of the Italian Institutional Framework – argued that not only the 
Jobs Act but also the constitutional bill should be understood as commensurate to the new 
constitutionalism perspective. The bill called for the abolishment of symmetric bicameralism, as well 
as for the revision of Title V of part II of the Constitution. Concerning the former, the bill would have 
excluded the Senate of the Republic would have been excluded from the vote of confidence. The 
Chamber of Deputies, therefore, would have been the only one to control Government’s political 
accountability. Further, the bill would have included the right of the Government to meet specific 
timing and deadlines for the final approval of national laws. Concerning the latter, the constitutional 
bill would have brought back to the State some key competences that the 2001 revision of Title V of 
part II moved towards local governments, inter alia labour policies, anti-trust regulation, strategic 
infrastructures and foreign policies. What is more, the executive would have been able to propose 
legislation to the Parliament on matters that originally were not reserved to the State (also referred to 
as ‘supremacy clause’), when required to protect the juridical and economic unity of Italy, or to 
protect national interests. Finally, the revision of Title V of part II of the Constitution would have 
amended the already existing ‘power to replace’ regional and local institutions when their action (or 
inaction) ‘would have violated international (including EU) obligations or compromised public 
safety, legal and economic unity or the guarantee of essential conditions for the exercise of rights, or 
in case of budget imbalances.  
In addition to this, the constitutional bill would have reshaped the system of constitutional 
guarantees (inter alia popular legislative initiative, as well as referendum). In particular, the bill 
would have raised from 50.000 to 150.000 the minimum number of signatures requested for enabling 
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such instruments of direct democracy. What is more, if the signatures collected would have been 
500.000, for the validity of the consultation would have been necessary the majority of people entitled 
to vote. By contrast, if the signatures collected would have been 800.000, the consultation would have 
been valid with the majority of voters. 
In order to understand the real essence of the constitutional bill proposed by the Matteo Renzi 
administration between 2014-2016, however, I also critically analysed the electoral law n. 52 of 2015 
(also referred to as Italicum) proposed by the same government. In particular, the Italicum promoted 
the formation of absolute majorities in national election, by means of an ‘electoral prize’ in case a 
political party (not a coalition) obtained more than 40% of the votes in the first round, or, in case of 
a second ballot, the sheer simple majority of voters. As one might expect, the electoral law would 
have applied only to the Chamber of Deputies. 
I thus argued that the ways in which the constitutional bill was justified by the government 
and others reflects what Sassen described as a neoliberal re-organising logic of nation-states, which 
entail the redistribution of powers from the legislative branch (including, parliaments and courts) to 
the executive one (such as, governments, central banks and ministries of finance). The executive 
branch thus must possess the institutional power to enable within national boarders new 
constitutionalist measures – both macroeconomic (such as financial policies) and microeconomic 
(including labour and pension policies) – the content of which are usually negotiated with the 
European Central Bank, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund. Italy’s 
constitutional seems to confirm this trend in that, as I have just described, the bill sought to centralise 
the power in the hands of the government, in order to ease and speed up the implementation of legal 
mechanisms coming from the European Union. 
Similarly to the Jobs Act, I argued that also the constitutional bill provoked a strong popular 
reaction. In the aftermath of the approval of the constitutional bill, indeed, one hundred and sixty-six 
members of the Chamber of Deputies, as well as one hundred and three members of the Senate of the 
Republic (all of them part of the opposition bloc, which included Movimento 5 Stelle, Fratelli d’Italia, 
Lega Nord, and Sinistra Italiana) officially proposed to the Supreme Court of Cassation a 
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constitutional referendum to approve or reject the contents of the constitutional bill. On 4 December 
2016, Italian voters were asked to decide whether accept or reject the constitutional bill, and voted to 
reject it by a majority of 59.11% (19.420.271) to 40.89% (13.431.842) approving.  
Finally, through the analysis of the electoral data, I tried to demonstrate the cause-and-effect 
relationship between the electoral behaviour of Italian voters and what this thesis understands as a 
neoliberal governance of the 2007 European financial and economic crisis. Data gathered, indeed, 
show that higher had been people’s dissatisfaction of their social and economic condition due to the 
crisis, higher had been their inclination to reject the constitutional bill. In particular, the majority of 
‘no’ voters were young and low-income people, who had been the hardest hit the most by the 
implementation of neoliberal measures. This interpretation is further backed up by the ‘geography of 
the vote’. Electoral data showed that the ‘no’ vote was especially strong in the South and the Islands, 
where the impact of neoliberal measures had been more dramatic. Further data suggested that Italian 
voters had perceived the constitutional bill more as a structural reform – imposed by the European 
Union – rather than a mere institutional arrangement. Data, hence, showed that Italian voters 
consistently followed the line of the country’s eurosceptic parties and political movements, which 
obtained great successes during the 2014 European Parliament election. 
The new constitutionalist analysis of the Jobs Act, as well as the constitutional bill – conceived 
by the European Union in the aftermath of the 2007 financial and economic crisis – made ‘visible’ 
the neoliberal logic of the regulations themselves. I argue that this argument is relevant for two main 
reason. Firstly, it shows that both the Jobs Act and the constitutional bill have sought to converge the 
Italian politico-legal system towards a more US and UK neoliberal model348 by revising two of the 
main legal documents in Italy: the 1947 Constitution of the Italian Republic, as well as the Workers 
Statute. Secondly, it stresses the law plays a leading role in creating and preserving.  
Exactly twenty years ago, Gill asserted that specific legal measures – that is to say, the 
Maastricht Agreements and the establishment of the EMU in 1992 – had shifted the European Union 
                                               
348 US and UK neoliberal model consist of – among many other features – the extreme liberalisation of the labour market 
system, as well as the empowerment of executive apparatuses to the detriment of the parliamentary institutions.  
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from a social democratic towards a neoliberal order. This thesis attempted to prove a similar 
assessment concerning both the constitutional bill and the Jobs Act within the Italian politico-legal 
system. First, the constitutional bill – had it been approved – would have severely affected the quality 
of the Italian democracy by centralising both administrative and legislative powers among the 
executive ‘hands’. Second, the Jobs Act has almost completed the liberalisation of the Italian labour 
market system by eliminating specific dismissal protections and other social securities. Because of 
this, living conditions of workers in Italy have severely worsened, spreading social uncertainty and 
insecurity across the country. 
It is not surprising that both the constitutional bill and the Jobs Act have been countered by 
the Italian population. This spread of malcontent, however, is not enough to propose an alternative 
vision of the existing order. The task of understanding how to organise what Gill and Cutler refer to 
as ‘resistance by means of law’349 is still open, and, I suggest, should be the focus of next analyses of 
Italian legal scholars and political scientists.
                                               
349 In particular, Cutler argues that resistance and insurgent power against the new constitutionalist regime can be 
channelled into the use of law. Drawing from work undertaken by the anthropologist Sally Engle Merry, she distinguishes 
three different type of resistance in and through law: first, resistance against law; second, resistance by means of law; and 
third, resistance which redefines the meaning of law. See: A. Claire Cutler, ‘New Constitutionalism and the Commodity 
Form of Global Capitalism’ in Stephen Gill and A. Claire Cutler (Ed), New Constitutionalism and World Order, 
(Cambridge University Press 2014); Sally Engle Merry, ‘Resistance and the Cultural Power of Law’ (1995) 29/1 Law & 
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